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I. INTRODUCTION
Laws exist in every state allowing for the involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization of persons believed to suffer from mental disorder.'
These laws are grounded in the state'sparenspatriae power, to care for
persons who are unable to care for themselves, and its "police power,"
to protect the public safety and welfare.2
In most states prior to the 1960's, "involuntary civil commitment"
was largely a medical phenomenon. Anyone deemed by a physician to
be "in need of treatment" ordinarily was subject to commitment; and
court involvement, where provided for, typically amounted to little
more than an "administrative monitoring, often cursory, of a medically
oriented process upon which jural apparatus ha[d] been grafted."3 In
the last twenty years, however, this "medical" approach to commitment
decision-making has given way to a more legalistic, due process ori-
ented approach. Pointing to the "massive curtailment of liberty" that
involuntary commitment entails, lawmakers throughout the country
have tightened commitment standards and accorded prospective pa-
tients an array of procedural rights and protections.' Some observers
contend that this "legalization" of the civil commitment process has
gone too far-that in many areas of the country it has become unrea-
sonably difficult to ensure that even seriously disordered persons re-
ceive the treatment they need.5 Others suggest that, despite these
changes in the law, civil commitment practices have changed very little
over the years and persons who threaten neither themselves nor others
continue to be hospitalized as before.6
In the interest of assessing the degree to which civil commitment
practices reflect civil commitment laws, and, moreover, to identify ways
in which civil commitment systems might function more effectively, the
Institute on Mental Disability and the Law of the National Center for
I. In many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, involuntary outpatient treatment is pos-
sible as well. See generally Practice Manual: State Laws Governing Civil Commitment, 3 MENTAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 205, 205-14 (1979).
2. See Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1207-23 (1974).
3. R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 259 (1968).
4. See Zimmerman & Fitch, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Discerning Eye of the Law,
5 STATE CT. J. 5 (1981).
5. See Chodoff, The Casefor Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 111, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 497 (1976).
6. See Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor Mental Disorder. The Application of California's
Lanterman-Petris-ShortAct, I I LAW & SOC'Y REV. 629 (1977); Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmer-
man, Administrative Civil Commitment. The Ins and Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 266 (1975); Markell & Hiday, Standards of Dangerousness. Impact of Civil Commitment
(unpublished manuscript) (available from Dr. Virginia Hiday of the Sociology Department at
North Carolina State University).
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State Courts in 1981 embarked on a multi-year study of civil commit-
ment practices and procedures throughout the country.7 Winston-Sa-
lem, North Carolina was one of six cities in which empirical research
was conducted.8 This article presents the findings of the research con-
ducted in Winston-Salem.9 It consists of a descriptive analysis of the
city's civil commitment system,'0 with reference to North Carolina
law, I and recommendations for improvement. The descriptive infor-
mation is drawn primarily from interviews conducted by the research
staff2 with representatives of the legal and mental health communities
in Winston-Salem. 3 The recommendations reflect the observations
and opinions of the persons interviewed as well as those of the research
staff and their advisors.' 4
7. The first phase of the study, conducted January 1, 1981-June 30, 1982, was supported by
grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago and a consortium of
community foundations, including the Winston-Salem Foundation of Winston-Salem, North Car-
olina. On-going research is funded by the MacArthur Foundation and the Aetna Life & Casualty
Foundation.
8. In addition to Winston-Salem, research was conducted in New York, Los Angeles, Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, and Columbus, Ohio. See W. FITCH, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN
WINSTON-SALEM (1982); W. FITCH, B. MCGRAW, J. HENDRYX & T. MARVELL. INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, NEW YORK CITY (1982); 1. KEILITZ, W.
FITCH & B. McGRAw, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN Los ANGELES COUNTY (1982); J.
ZIMMERMAN, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN CHICAGO (1982); 1. KEILITZ & B. McGRAw,
AN EVALUATION OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN MILWAUKEE COUNTY (1983); 1. KEI-
LITZ, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLUMBUS, OHIO (1982). These monographs are
available at the National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia. This research pro-
vided the basis for the development of national-scope guidelines for civil commitment. See INSTI-
TUTE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE LAW, PROVISIONAL SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT (1982) [hereinafter cited as PROVISIONAL
SUBSTANTIVE GUIDELINES].
9. The research in Winston-Salem was conducted in 1981 and 1982, and the findings re-
ported in this article date from those years. The North Carolina statutes pertaining to outpatient
commitment were substantially revised in 1983 (effective January 1984). See Act of June 29, 1983,
ch. 638, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 104 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.1 to .13 (Cum.
Supp. 1983)). It is reasonable to expect that outpatient commitment practices in Winston-Salem
will vary somewhat from those described herein. Because the focus of this article is on commit-
ment practices rather than commitment laws, however, much of what is reported here will remain
unaffected by statutory change.
10. The focus of this article is on procedures for the civil commitment of mentally ill persons
in Winston-Salem. The article is not intended to apply to the commitment of juveniles, the men-
tally retarded (except those whose retardation is accompanied by a behavior disorder that renders
them dangerous), the developmentally disabled, or persons charged with, convicted of, or acquit-
ted by reason of insanity of a criminal offense.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-1 to -122 (1981). See supra note 9.
12. The research staff consisted of Joel Zimmerman, Ph.D.; Ingo Keilitz, Ph.D.; Janice Hen-
dryx, M.A.; and the author. Valuable assistance was provided by Paul Barnett and Doug Shop-
pert, law students at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
13. Interviews were conducted with judges, court clerks, attorneys, psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, social workers, hospital administrative personnel, law enforcement officers, former patients,
families of patients, and state agency representatives.
14. During the course of the study, the research staff were counseled by a board of advisors
consisting of Paul Appelbaum, University of Pittsburg; Paul Friedman, Ennis, Friedman, Bersoff,
and Ewing; B. James George, Jr., New York Law School; Richard P. Lynch, American Bar Asso-
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II. THE PREHEARING PROCESS
This section considers the events in the involuntary commitment pro-
cess that take place prior to a court hearing. Many cases are disposed
of in the prehearing stage. Respondents' 5 in some cases are screened
out by the clerk who reviews the allegations of the petitioner or by the
physician who conducts the initial evaluation; in other cases they may
be hospitalized for evaluation and observation but be discharged
before the hearing is held. Some respondents become voluntary pa-
tients during the prehearing period, obviating the need for further judi-
cial involvement.
The manner in which commitment cases are handled prior to hear-
ing may have more bearing on the overall "success" of a commitment
system than what happens at any other stage in the commitment pro-
cess. Systems that provide for an effective, community-based screening
and diversion of inappropriate cases protect both the liberty interests of
the respondent and the fiscal interests of the state.
A. Description
1. Initiating the Commitment
Anyone in North Carolina may petition for the commitment of an-
other who is considered to be mentally ill or inebriate and dangerous to
self or others, or mentally retarded and, because of an accompanying
behavior disorder, dangerous to others.' 6 The petitioner ordinarily
must appear before a clerk of the superior court or a magistrate of the
district court and execute an affidavit concerning the proposed patient's
mental condition.' 7 If the clerk or magistrate finds reasonable grounds
to believe that the facts alleged in the affidavit are true and that the
respondent probably meets the criteria for commitment, he or she may
order the respondent taken into custody by a law enforcement officer
for examination by a qualified physician.' 8
In Winston-Salem, the assistant clerk of the superior court receives
petitions for involuntary commitment at the courthouse during regular
business hours. Three magistrates receive petitions on a shift basis at
ciation; Floyd E. Propst, Fulton County (Georgia) Probate Court; Loren H. Roth, University of
Pittsburg; Joseph Schneider (chairperson), Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court; David B. Wexler,
University of Arizona; and Helen Wright, National Association for Mental Health. In addition,
researchers in Winston-Salem received guidance from a local advisory board chaired by Gary P.
Tash, Judge of the District Court serving Winston-Salem.
15. Prospective involuntary patients are referred to as respondents throughout this article.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12 2 -58.3(a) (1981).
17. Id. Affiants who are qualified physicians may execute the oath to the affidavit before any
official authorized to administer oaths. They are not required to appear before the clerk or magis-
trate for this purpose. Id. § 122-58.3(d).
18. Id § 122-58.3(b).
6
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their residences during the evening hours and on weekends.19 A pro-
spective petitioner may initiate a proceeding by telephoning the clerk
and explaining why he or she believes that someone needs to be com-
mitted. If commitment clearly is not indicated, the clerk may refer the
caller to other assistance."0 If the caller's allegations provide reason-
able grounds to believe that the person meets the commitment criteria,
the clerk will invite the caller to appear in person for the purpose of
submitting a petition for commitment.
When the petitioner appears, the clerk explains the commitment pro-
cedure and again considers the petitioner's reasons for pursuing a com-
mitment. If it appears that the proposed patient would not meet the
criteria for commitment, the clerk may suggest that the petitioner seek
help for the person in some way other than by involuntary commit-
ment. If the petitioner's allegations would support a commitment, the
clerk types out a petition/affidavit and has the petitioner sign and give
an oath. Then the clerk issues an order for the respondent's custody,
schedules a hearing, and issues notices of the hearing to be served on
the respondent and the petitioner. Finally, the clerk completes a form
entitled "instructions for service of involuntary commitment papers,"
advising the law enforcement officer where the respondent is to be
taken for examination. Before completing this form, the clerk provides
the petitioner with an opportunity to arrange for commitment to a pri-
vate facility, if desired.
Under particular "emergency circumstances,"'2 a law enforcement
officer may take someone into custody and bring him or her immedi-
ately before a magistrate or a clerk without a prior order. In such
cases, the law enforcement officer must execute the affidavit and swear
to the emergency circumstances. If the clerk or magistrate finds by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the facts stated in the affi-
davit are true and that emergency circumstances exist, he or she may
order the person taken directly to a community or regional mental
health facility for inpatient custody and observation pending a court
hearing. 2
As a matter of practice in Winston-Salem, persons taken into custody
pursuant to the emergency procedure ordinarily are not brought before
a clerk or a magistrate before they are hospitalized. Rather, law en-
forcement officers typically take such persons directly to a mental
19. Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, references to the clerk are intended to
apply to the magistrates as well.
20. Cases involving alcohol or drug abuse routinely are diverted.
21. Emergency circumstances exist when a person subject to detention under the statute "is
also violent and requires restraint, and delay in taking him or her to a qualified physician for
examination would likely endanger life or property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.18 (1981).
22. Id § 122-58.18.
7
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health facility and arrange for detention there, either by another officer
or by the facility staff, while they appear before the clerk to petition for
the commitment and arrange for the necessary papers.
By all reports, the assistant clerk of the superior court in Winston-
Salem is readily accessible to petitioners and the police during regular
working hours. The district court magistrates reportedly are not so ac-
cessible, however. Each of the magistrates is said to reside outside of
the city limits, necessitating a drive of twenty to thirty minutes each
way for petitioners and the police. Furthermore, while the assistant
clerk of the court is known for carefully reviewing the facts before issu-
ing a petition, the magistrates are said to vary considerably in the qual-
ity of review they provide.
2. Taking Custody of the Respondent
Within twenty-four hours after a custody order is signed, a law en-
forcement officer must take the respondent into custody. Immediately
upon assuming custody and, in any event, within forty-eight hours, the
officer must take the respondent to a community mental health center
for examination by a qualified physician. If no qualified physician is
available at the community mental health center, the officer may take
the respondent to any qualified physician who is available locally. If
no qualified physician is immediately available in the locality, the of-
ficer may temporarily detain the respondent in a community mental
health facility, if one is available. If none is available, the officer may
arrange for detention of the respondent, under appropriate supervision,
in the respondent's home, in a private hospital or clinic, in a general
hospital, or in a regional mental health facility, but not in a jail or other
penal facility.23 If the affiant who obtained the custody order is a qual-
ified physician,24 or if the respondent was taken into custody pursuant
to the emergency procedure described above, 25 the community-based
examination requirement does not apply and the law enforcement of-
ficer may take the respondent directly to a mental health facility for
custody and observation pending a hearing.
If the respondent is a female, she must be accompanied to the hospi-
tal by a member of her family, if a family member is available; other-
wise, she must be accompanied by a female designated by the director
of social services of the county of the female's residence or the county
of admission.26 The statutes authorize the officer issuing the custody
order under certain circumstances to permit the respondent's family or
23. Id. § 122-58.4(a).
24. Id. § 122-58.4(b).
25. Id § 122-58.18.
26. Id. § 122-49.
8
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immediate friends to transport the respondent to the hospital if they
wish.2"
Whenever feasible, law enforcement officers transporting respon-
dents are to dress in plain clothes and use unmarked vehicles.2" Officers
may use reasonable force to restrain respondents if necessary to protect
themselves, respondents, or others, and may not be held criminally or
civilly liable for assault, false imprisonment, or other torts or crimes for
"reasonable measures taken under the authority of this Article."29
In Winston-Salem, a special, three-officer, plain-clothes unit of the
city police department is responsible for the transportation of respon-
dents during business hours. These officers execute custody orders is-
sued by the clerk and transport respondents to court on the hearing day
each week. Uniformed officers typically are involved in emergency
cases and in cases arising when the officers of the special unit are
unavailable.3"
The Winston-Salem police reportedly do not ordinarily arrange to
have a family member or designated female accompany an officer en-
gaged in the transportation of a female respondent. However, to dis-
courage police misconduct and at the same time create a record to
protect the police department against charges of improper conduct dur-
ing the period of transportation, the police have a procedure of record-
ing the time of day and the police car's odometer reading when a
female respondent is taken into custody and again when the police car
arrives at its destination. The presumption is that no improper conduct
has occurred if the recorded time and distance are compatible.
Although the custody order issued by the clerk ordinarily permits the
officer to deliver the respondent to any approved treatment facility,3
the "instructions for service of involuntary commitment papers" are
specific with regard to delivery of the respondent, designating a single
receiving facility. Police officers in Winston-Salem believe that they
have no authority to take the respondent to any facility other than the
one designated in the instructions. If the designated facility refuses to
receive a respondent ordered for evaluation (which sometimes happens
when all of the facility's beds are occupied), police officers believe they
must release the respondent. Representatives of the court, however,
maintain that officers are not so constrained by the clerk's instructions
and may deliver respondents who are refused at one facility to any
27. Id. § 122-58.14(d).
28. Id. § 122-58.14(b).
29. Id. § 122-58.14(c).
30. Respondents from counties served by the Winston-Salem courts are transported by law
enforcement officers from the counties' sherifrs departments.
31. This was revealed by an examination of several orders.
9
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other approved facility for examination.32
In Winston-Salem, the facility to which the respondent is taken ini-
tially typically is the one in which he or she will be detained pending
the hearing. This variation from the statutory provision contemplating
outpatient evaluation at a community mental health center and pre-
hearing detention in another facility is made possible by the availabil-
ity of in-patient facilities to serve both functions in Winston-Salem.
The mental health facilities in Winston-Salem have varying policies
with regard to the respondent's custody before and during the initial
examination. At the local public facility, the officer must wait with the
patient until the examining physician arrives and completes the exami-
nation.33 At the private facilities, the officers are permitted to leave the
respondent in the facility's custody until the physician arrives to con-
duct the examination. It was suggested that the private facilities agree
to take custody because respondents destined for these facilities tend to
be less aggressive and difficult to hold and because it may take signifi-
cantly longer, particularly during off-hours, for physicians to become
available to conduct examinations at the private facilities.
Police officers in Winston-Salem report that they occasionally will
notify a hospital in advance that a respondent is being brought in, but
the hospitals rarely will call an examining physician until after the of-
ficer has arrived at the facility with the respondent and the appropriate
papers from the court. A spokesperson at one facility explained that
physicians are not called sooner because the custody-taking sometimes
is delayed and the respondent may not arrive until several hours after
the officer's call.
3. Screening the Respondent (The Initial Examination)
Respondents taken into custody must be examined by a qualified
physician as soon as possible and, in any event, within twenty-four
hours after presentation for examination at a mental health facility.34
If the examining physician believes that the respondent meets the statu-
tory criteria for commitment, the respondent may be taken to a com-
munity or regional mental health facility for temporary custody,
observation, and treatment pending the hearing. If the physician be-
32. Of course, respondents examined at one facility and found not to meet the commitment
criteria may not be delivered to a second facility for further evaluation.
33. It was reported that during business hours an officer usually must wait approximately
thirty minutes for a physician to arrive to conduct the examination. The wait may be as long as
two hours. During off-hours, when physicians are on call, the wait reportedly is a minimum of
sixty minutes.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.4(c) (1981). As noted earlier, this initial evaluation is not
required if the affiant was a qualified physician or if the respondent was taken into custody pursu-
ant to the emergency procedure. See supra note 17.
10
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lieves that the respondent does not meet the commitment criteria, the
respondent must be released and the proceedings must be terminated.
The findings of the physician and the facts on which they are based
must be put in writing and be transmitted to the clerk of the superior
court. If the clerk is unlikely to receive the physician's report within
forty-eight hours after it was signed, the physician also must communi-
cate his or her findings to the clerk by telephone.35
The statute clearly contemplates that the initial medical examination
will function essentially as an outpatient, community-based screening
of the respondent to determine whether the commitment proceeding
should continue. In Winston-Salem, because this initial examination is
conducted at the same facility in which the respondent may be detained
pending a hearing, the results of the examination typically are used to
determine the respondent's treatment needs as well as whether the pro-
ceeding should continue.
In Winston-Salem the initial examination is said always to be con-
ducted within twenty-four hours of the respondent's presentation at the
facility. After the examination, the physician completes a court form
indicating his or her findings and presents the form to the police officer
for delivery to the court. If the police officer is unavailable, the physi-
cian mails the form to the court.
4. Prehearing Detention
If the physician conducting the initial evaluation of the respondent
believes that the respondent is committable, the respondent is trans-
ported to a community mental health facility or some other public or
private facility for temporary custody, observation, and treatment
pending a court hearing. If no community mental health facility is
available and the respondent is unable to pay for his or her care at a
private facility, the law enforcement officer may take the respondent to
a regional psychiatric facility. 6
Because Winston-Salem has a number of local, inpatient facilities
that are available to conduct initial evaluations and function as pre-
hearing detention facilities as well, respondents ordinarily need not be
moved following the initial evaluation. Respondents awaiting hearing
in Winston-Salem typically are detained in one of three local facilities:
Forsyth-Stokes Community Mental Health Center, a public commu-
nity mental health center; Forsyth Memorial Hospital, a private facil-
ity; or Mandala Center, also a private facility. If the respondent is
particularly violent, he or she may be detained at the John Umstead
Hospital in Butner (one of four regional psychiatric facilities in North
35. Id § 122-58.4(c)-(d).
36. Id. § 122-58.4(c).
11
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Carolina). Reportedly, respondents are seldom transferred from one
facility to another during the prehearing period unless a medical emer-
gency requires transfer to a general services hospital.
Contemplating removal of the respondent to a detaining facility fol-
lowing an initial evaluation elsewhere, the law provides that, within
twenty-four hours of arrival at the detaining facility, the respondent
must be examined by a qualified physician.37 If the physician con-
ducting this examination believes that the respondent does not meet the
commitment criteria, he or she must release the respondent pending the
court hearing and notify the clerk who issued the custody order.38 De-
spite this release requirement, physicians in the hospitals in Winston-
Salem report that they frequently retain respondents until their hear-
ings regardless of the results of this examination. More discussion of
this subject will appear in the section on Prehearing Discharge.
The maximum time allowed by statute for prehearing detention is
ten days, unless a continuance is ordered.39 It was reported that hear-
ings are conducted reliably within the statutory period in Winston-
Salem.
Although the law provides for notice to the respondent, the peti-
tioner, and the respondent's counsel of the time and place of the hear-
ing, there is no requirement that notification of the respondent's
detention be given to anyone. The policies of the local facilities vary
with regard to notice. The staff of one facility reported that, if the re-
spondent is brought in by a police officer, every effort is made to notify
members of the respondent's family. Staff at another facility stated
that, although there is no official notification policy, family members
usually are involved in the respondent's treatment. The policy at the
third local facility is not to release information about patients without
their consent.
5. Prehearing Examination
The law provides that a respondent must be examined by a qualified
physician within twenty-four hours of his or her arrival at the facility in
which he or she will be detained pending a hearing.40 The findings of
the physician and the facts on which they are based must be put in
writing and be transmitted to the clerk of the superior court by "relia-
ble and expeditious means."'" If the affiant for commitment is a physi-
cian, a second qualified physician (who is not treating the patient) must
37. Id § 122-58.6(a). This second examination is described later in this article. See infra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6(a) (1981).
39. Id. § 122-58.7(a).
40. Id. § 122-58.6(a).
41. Id. § 122-58.6(b).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/4
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
perform the examination at the detaining facility.4 2
Because respondents in Winston-Salem usually are detained pre-
hearing in the same facility in which they were examined initially, the
second examination, as a practical matter, is not always conducted
within twenty-four hours of admission. The policies of the local facili-
ties vary in this regard. At two of the facilities, the staff were uncertain
whether the second examination was to be conducted within twenty-
four hours of the respondent's arrival at the facility or within twenty-
four hours of the first evaluation. In any event, the staff at both facili-
ties indicated that this requirement usually was not met and that the
second evaluation typically was not conducted until about two to four
days after the respondent's admission to the facility. At the third facil-
ity, second examinations reportedly are conducted three or four days
after the initial examination; if there is a significant difference of opin-
ion between the first two examination reports, a third examination is
conducted.
No one at any of the facilities in Winston-Salem suggested that re-
spondents were ever advised of a right to remain silent during the ex-
amination. However, one facility has a policy to inform everyone
admitted as a result of court involvement how the information gener-
ated by the examination might be used in court.
Hospital personnel report that respondents in Winston-Salem very
rarely request to be examined by an independent physician. When
such requests are made, the hospitals reportedly are happy to cooper-
ate. However, the cost of the examination must be borne by the re-
spondent; there is no right in North Carolina to an independent
examination at the government's expense.
The facilities in Winston-Salem have differing policies concerning
the release or continued detention of respondents found by the examin-
ing physician not to meet the criteria for commitment. While some
physicians routinely discharge such respondents pending the hearing,
others believe that only the judge may order release.43
6. Prehearing Treatment
Pending the court hearing, "the qualified physician attending the re-
spondent is authorized to administer reasonable and appropriate...
medication and treatment that is consistent with accepted medical stan-
42. Id § 122-58.3(d).
43. Recall that a finding of noncommittability at the initial examination results in a dismissal
of the proceeding; a hearing still must be held if the findings of the physician conducting the
second examination (the first for respondents detained pursuant to the emergency procedure or
upon the affidavit of a qualified physician) show that the respondent does not meet the commit-
ment criteria.
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dards."" The statutes guarantee patients a right to treatment "includ-
ing medical care and habilitation, regardless of age, degree of
retardation or mental illness."4 Patients also have a "right to be free
from unnecessary or excessive medication with drugs" and from the
use of drugs as punishment or discipline.46 Finally, extraordinary
forms of treatment (electroshock therapy, the use of experimental drugs
or procedures, and surgery other than emergency surgery) may not be
given without the patient's informed written consent.4 7
Medication is reportedly administered to most involuntarily commit-
ted patients in Winston-Salem, regardless of their legal status; respon-
dents, more often than not, are under the influence of medication at
their hearings. At no facility in Winston-Salem is the respondent ad-
vised of any right to refuse treatment. Whether and to what extent
such a right is extended to patients who object to treatment varies
among the city's treatment facilities. A spokesperson for one of the
facilities reported that non-dangerous patients were accorded a right to
refuse treatment but dangerous patients were not. He added that only
an "indication of potential dangerousness" was necessary; the patient
need not have committed an overt, dangerous act. Another person as-
sociated with the same facility reported that the policy was to recognize
a right to refuse treatment except in circumstances of "imminent dan-
ger." This spokesperson indicated a belief that the right to refuse treat-
ment was a matter of statute in North Carolina and that unless a
patient were imminently dangerous an adjudication of the patient's in-
competency would be necessary before treatment could be forced. It
was reported at another facility that the policy concerning treatment
refusal followed the "best interests" rationale; the physician would re-
frain from treating only if it were in the patient's best interests. For
example, a physician might consider whether forcing medication would
so destroy the rapport between doctor and patient as to create a greater
negative effect on the patient's recovery than would the lack of medica-
tion. A spokesperson for the third facility reported that the right to
refuse treatment was asserted so infrequently that no policy had been
formulated. He stated that the rare patient who refused treatment
would likely be transferred to another facility.
7. Conversion to Voluntary Status and Retention of Voluntary
Patients
The statutes in North Carolina declare that "[i]t is the policy of the
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6(c) (1981).
45. Id § 122-55.5.
46. Id § 122-55.6.
47. Id
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State to encourage voluntary admissions to treatment facilities.
48
"Any person who believes himself or herself to be in need of treatment
for mental illness or inebriety may seek voluntary admission to a treat-
ment facility" 49 by completing a written application for admission and
presenting himself or herself to the facility for evaluation. The person
must acknowledge in the application that he or she may be held by the
treatment facility for a period of seventy-two hours subsequent to any
request that he or she may make to be released. If the evaluating phy-
sician determines that the person is not in need of treatment or further
evaluation by the facility or that the person will not benefit from the
treatment available, the person will not be accepted as a patient by the
facility.5
Observers in Winston-Salem voiced differing opinions concerning
the frequency with which involuntary patients convert to voluntary sta-
tus. Everyone agrees that at least some savvy respondents attempt to
convert in order to win the right to request their release. Some people
in the community have the impression that the local facilities recognize
an absolute right of involuntary patients to convert to voluntary status
and that many such patients were converting and then quickly dis-
charging themselves. Judges in Winston-Salem, however, declare that
respondents have no right to convert to voluntary status, only the right
to request such a conversion, and that committed patients may be con-
verted only with the approval of the treating physician. One judge
stated that if a respondent were before him during a hearing and the
doctor's recommendation were that the respondent be allowed to be-
come a voluntary patient, he would have no objection unless other facts
before the court compelled an involuntary commitment.
Like the judges, physicians in Winston-Salem recognize no right of
the respondent to convert to voluntary status, but most admit that they
are reluctant to deny a respondent's request to convert. A spokesper-
son for one of the facilities in Winston-Salem estimated that fifty per-
cent of the commitment cases in which it was involved resulted in a
recommendation to the court that the respondent be permitted to re-
main at the facility on a voluntary basis.
Various perceptions exist in Winston-Salem regarding what is done
with dangerous voluntary patients who request discharge. Community
representatives and attorneys believe that the facilities routinely grant
discharge requests. However, spokespersons for the facilities report
that if a voluntary patient requesting release is seriously ill and "really
dangerous," the facility physicians either will arrange for a relative of
48. Id § 122-56.1.
49. Id. § 122-56.3.
50. Id
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the patient to petition for involuntary commitment or, if this is not pos-
sible, will submit a petition themselves. A spokesperson for one of the
facilities suggested that, in this situation, a physician usually can deter
the patient from following through with his or her request for discharge
by threatening to bring an involuntary commitment action.
8. Prehearing Discharge
If the qualified physician conducting the initial examination of the
respondent believes that the respondent does not meet the commitment
criteria, the respondent must be released and the proceedings must be
terminated.5' If the qualified physician conducting the second exami-
nation (or the first if pursuant to the emergency procedure or upon a
medical affidavit) believes that the respondent does not meet the com-
mitment criteria, the respondent must be released pending the hearing
and the clerk of the superior court of the county from which the re-
spondent was sent must be notified.52 Finally, any involuntarily com-
mitted patient in North Carolina who is determined by the chief
medical officer of the hospital to be no longer in need of hospitalization
must be released.53
As a matter of practice in Winston-Salem, respondents ordinarily are
released if the qualified physician conducting the initial evaluation de-
termines that the commitment criteria are not met. If the initial exami-
nation results in a finding of committability but the physician
conducting the second examination believes that the respondent is not
committable, the respondent may or may not be discharged. Some ob-
servers in Winston-Salem contend that automatic discharge upon a
finding of noncommittability by the second examining physician is in-
appropriate because both examinations are conducted by highly
trained psychiatrists at the same facility and a disagreement between
such professionals creates a valid question about the committability of
the respondent.
A spokesperson at one facility reported that the discharge decision
was for the treating physician to make and the physician conducting
the initial evaluation ordinarily was the treating physician. According
to this spokesperson, if the treating physician's examination resulted in
a finding of committability but the second examiner's opinion was that
the respondent was not committable, the treating physician might: de-
fer to the opinion of the second examining physician and release the
respondent, conduct a re-examination of the respondent, or observe the
respondent's progress in the facility for a few days before deciding
51. Id. § 122-58.4(c).
52. Id. § 122-58.6(a).
53. Id. § 122-58.13.
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whether to discharge. A spokesperson at one of the other local facilities
reported that, regardless of whether the second examining physician
believes that the respondent meets the commitment criteria, the respon-
dent always is detained in the facility until the time of the hearing.
Reportedly, no one in the community ordinarily is notified when a re-
spondent is discharged prior to the hearing.
B. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations for Improvement
1. Initiating the Commitment
The requirement that any attempt to initiate a commitment be sub-
ject to a judicial screening is a strength of the North Carolina commit-
ment procedure. Although some people in Winston-Salem believe that
the screening unduly delays the provision of treatment, most agree that
its potential for protecting against unwarranted infringement of the re-
spondent's liberty and for saving the cost of unnecessary detention, ex-
amination, etc., more than offsets the delay concern.
Many people in Winston-Salem believe that the use of magistrates to
screen prospective patients is not effective. Requiring prospective peti-
tioners or the police to travel outside of the limits of the city to the
homes of magistrates is viewed by some as a serious weakness in the
city's commitment system because it makes initiating a commitment
difficult and slow. It is especially problematic for police involved in
emergency cases, as the law requires that respondents in emergencies
be taken directly before a clerk or magistrate prior to hospitalization.
Recommendation: In order to improve access of prospective petitioners
and the police to the magistrates, one or more of the follo wingprocedures
should be implemented-
" only magistrates living within the city limits of Winston-Salem
should be authorized to receive commitment applications;
" a clerk or a magistrate who is authorized to receive commitment
applications should be available at the courthouse at all times;
" a system should be developed to enable petitions for involuntary
commitments to be submitted and approved by telephone.54
54. A telephone commitment application system might be devised to function much like tele-
phone warrant systems that are being used in some states to enable criminal warrants to be ob-
tained by telephone. One possible procedure would be for a prospective petitioner or the police to
telephone the magistrate at his or her home and communicate whatever allegations would other-
wise be communicated in person. The magistrate would consider the allegations, and, if he or she
decided that a petition were in order, would prepare such a petition and read it over the telephone
to a law enforcement officer at the police department designated to perform the ministerial func-
tion of copying the petition onto an appropriate form, signing the magistrate's name (on the mag-
istrate's authorization), and making the petition available at the police department for the
signature of the petitioner or police officer initiating the commitment. The magistrate would de-
liver a signed written authorization for the petition as soon as possible by mail or otherwise.
17
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The special statutory provision allowing the police to take persons
into custody under emergency circumstances is a strong feature of the
North Carolina commitment law. It promotes the public's safety and
provides for the immediate treatment needs of seriously disordered per-
sons. Further, because it restricts immediate custody-taking to particu-
lar emergency situations and conditions detention on a judicial finding
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent meets the
commitment criteria, it provides a measure of protection for the re-
spondent's liberty interests as well.
Although not in compliance with the requirements of North Caro-
lina law, the practice of the police in Winston-Salem to take respon-
dents detained pursuant to the emergency procedure directly to a
treatment facility (rather than before a clerk or magistrate) may be rea-
sonable in some cases. When someone is severely disordered, unusu-
ally violent, and otherwise in need of immediate attention, delay in
hospitalizing the person may be harmful to the person as well as to the
interests of society. The requirement that respondents in emergencies
be taken immediately before a magistrate or a clerk appears to have
been formulated with the rural areas of North Carolina in mind, to
prevent the taking of respondents to facilities outside of their commu-
nities without some prior judicial review. Because of the availability of
prehearing detention facilities in Winston-Salem, however, no such re-
moval from the community ordinarily is necessary.
Recommendation: A statutory amendment should be sought authorizing a
law enforcement officer to transport a respondent directly to the closest
mental health facility in an emergency.55
The practices of the clerk's office in the initiation of commitment
proceedings complement the statutory provisions and result in a satis-
factory initiation procedure in Winston-Salem. The policy of the clerk
to explain the civil commitment procedure to petitioners is applauded
by many people in Winston-Salem. The opportunity provided to the
petitioner to arrange for commitment to a private facility also is recog-
nized as a strong feature because it makes commitment more palatable
to some petitioners. The forms developed and used by the clerk's office
for recording allegations, instructing officers concerning the service of
55. The amendment might be drafted in such a way that the law enforcement officer's au-
thority would be conditional. For example, in order to minimize the intrusion on the respondent's
liberty, the authorization might be made applicable only when a facility is located near the place
where the respondent was taken into custody (e.g., within twenty-five miles); and the provision
might require the release of the respondent from the facility if, within a given amount of time
following detention (e.g., two and one-half hours), no properly executed custody order is received
by the facility.
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commitment papers, etc., seem to be well-designed to capture and con-
vey important information.
Despite the overall reasonableness of the commitment initiation pro-
cedures in Winston-Salem, many people in both the mental health and
the legal communities in the city believe that petitions too often are
approved for persons who clearly do not meet the commitment criteria.
Some believe that the magistrates almost never deny a petition request.
Observing that "petitioners often exaggerate allegations in order to per-
suade the clerk to approve the petition," one psychiatrist suggested that
very few respondents sent for evaluation truly are dangerous to them-
selves or others. Of course, the burden of proof applicable in the
clerk's screening is relatively low; therefore, it should not be very sur-
prising that many questionable cases survive this review, particularly
cases arising during the hours when magistrates are on call (since these
are more likely to involve respondents whose needs are dire). To the
extent that inappropriate cases are processed through the system, re-
spondents suffer an unnecessary deprivation of liberty and society suf-
fers an unnecessary expense.
Recommendation: The clerk and the magistrates should review carefully
the allegations of petitioners before approving petitions and issuing cus-
tody orders.
2. Taking Custody of the Respondent
The law in North Carolina and the practice in Winston-Salem re-
garding the transportation of respondents in civil commitment proceed-
ings are generally commendable. The use of unmarked cars and plain-
clothes police protects the privacy interests of the respondent and may
be psychologically less traumatic as well. The conditions under which
the police may take someone into custody without prior judicial ap-
proval provide a reasonable protection against unwarranted police ac-
tion and yet allow for immediate attention to cases presenting true
emergencies.
The failure of the police department in Winston-Salem to comply
with the statutory requirement that a member of the respondent's fam-
ily or a female designated by the county accompany the police officer
engaged in the transportation of a female respondent does not seem to
be a matter of particular concern to anyone in Winston-Salem. More-
over, the department's special procedure of recording the time of day
and odometer reading when a respondent is taken into custody and
comparing this with the time of the respondent's delivery and the
odometer reading at that point provides a measure of protection
against possible mishandling of the respondent during the period of
19
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transportation. Nevertheless, the police should recognize that their op-
erating policy is not in compliance with statute and that, as a result, an
officer accused of misconduct may find it more difficult to claim immu-
nity from liability.
The occasional practice of law enforcement officers in Winston-Sa-
lem to notify a facility in advance when a detention is anticipated is an
excellent method for expediting the screening and evaluation process,
particularly during the evening hours and on weekends, when physi-
cians are on call. The reluctance of the local facilities to call a physi-
cian prior to the respondent's arrival at the facility negates the possible
benefits of this notification. Of course, such reluctance is understanda-
ble if the delivery of promised respondents very often is delayed.
Recommendation. Whenever practical, particularly during the evening
hours and on weekends, any law enforcement officer responsiblefor trans-
porting a respondent to a mental health facilityfor evaluation should tele-
phone the facility in advance and alert personnel of the facility that a
respondent is to be deliveredfor evaluation. Such a call should be made
only after the officer is reasonably certain that the respondent will be
taken into custody without delay. Upon receiving such a call, the facility
personnel immediately should make the necessary arrangements for a
qual/iedphysician to be available to evaluate the respondent as soon after
the respondent's arrival as possible. If the custody-taking is delayed, the
officer immediately should telephone the facility and report the delay.
The procedure that is followed in at least one of the local mental
health facilities, whereby the law enforcement officer must wait with
the respondent at the facility until the examining physician has com-
pleted the examination, has strong and weak features. One strength is
that the officer's presence during the examination makes it possible for
the examining physician to question the officer about the circumstances
under which the respondent was taken into custody. It enables the of-
ficer promptly to return the respondent to his or her home should he or
she be found not to meet the commitment criteria. A weakness, how-
ever, is that the officer often must be idle for an hour or more, waiting
for a qualified physician to become available to conduct the examina-
tion. In an effort to balance these interests, the following recommenda-
tion is made.
Recommendation: The officer taking the respondent to the mental health
facilityfor evaluation ordinarily should remain at the facility, fpossible,
until the physician has completed his or her evaluation and made a com-
mittability determination. However, !f it isforeseen that no physician will
be available to begin the evaluation within a reasonable period of time
following the officer's arrival at the facility, the officer should be free to
20
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leave the respondent in the custody of the facility. In any event, the officer
(or another officer) should be available on short notice to return the re-
spondent to his or her home or other place should the physicianfind that
the respondent does not meet the commitment criteria.
The practice of the Winston-Salem police to release respondents re-
fused for evaluation by the facility designated on the officer's "instruc-
tions for service of involuntary commitment papers" is a matter of
great concern to some people in the city. These people contend that
because respondents ordered for evaluation already have been deter-
mined "probably" to meet the commitment criteria, release should not
occur before evaluation if any local facility is available to conduct an
evaluation. Representatives of the court agree and dismiss this issue as
a misunderstanding on the part of the local law enforcement officers.
They point out that the facility named in the instructions simply is the
facility to which the respondent should be delivered first and that noth-
ing in the instructions is intended to prevent a law enforcement officer
from taking a respondent refused for evaluation at one facility to an-
other approved facility for evaluation.
Recommendation: The clerk should indicate clearly on the "'instructions
for service of involuntary commitment papers" that the officer may deliver
the respondent to another approvedfacilityfor evaluation if the initialfa-
cility to which the law enforcement officer is instructed to deliver the re-
spondent refuses to receive the respondent for evaluation.
3. Screening the Respondent (The Initial Examination)
The statutory provision for a medical screening in the community
prior to hospitalization is a strong feature of the commitment proce-
dure in North Carolina. It is especially important for respondents re-
siding in rural areas, as it protects against their removal from the
community until such removal (for care and custody at a regional facil-
ity pending a hearing) is determined to be medically necessary. The
provision arguably is not as important in Winston-Salem, however, be-
cause the facilities in which respondents in Winston-Salem usually are
detained prior to prehearing are located in the city.
The exception to the requirement for an initial community screening
in emergency cases is necessary to expedite the detention and treatment
of persons whose needs require immediate attention. The absence of
the liberty protection provided by the community-based screening is
balanced somewhat by the higher burden of proof (clear, cogent, and
convincing) that must be met in the clerk's or magistrate's screening of
allegations in emergency cases.
One possible weakness in North Carolina's commitment law and in
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the practice in Winston-Salem concerns the lack of notification given to
the respondent concerning the manner in which information generated
by the evaluation might be used by the court. Additional discussion of
this issue appears later, in the Prehearing Examination section.
4. Prehearing Detention
A strong feature of the North Carolina law governing prehearing de-
tention is that it restricts detention exclusively to mental health facili-
ties. Furthermore, it permits detention in one of the state's regional
psychiatric facilities only if no public mental health facility is available
in the community and private commitment is not feasible. People in
Winston-Salem agree that detention in any of the city's community fa-
cilities is preferable, from a therapeutic standpoint, to detention in the
regional facility at Butner.
A possible weakness in the prehearing detention law in North Caro-
lina is its failure to provide for the release of respondents into the com-
munity during the prehearing period.56 Given that only persons who
are alleged to be dangerous to themselves or others are subject to com-
mitment, however, it is unlikely that prehearing release often would be
appropriate. Indeed, research in states whose laws permit prehearing
release reveals that, in practice, respondents very rarely are released
pending their hearings. 7
A number of people in Winston-Salem believe that ten days is too
long for respondents to be detained without judicial review. In some
states, a preliminary probable cause hearing must be held within a
number of hours of detention, followed by a full hearing thereafter.
Research has shown that such an arrangement is not always satisfac-
tory, however.58 Probable cause hearings add greatly to the cost of
commitment, and the low burden of proof required at probable cause
hearings usually is met in all but the most blatantly abusive cases
(which should be detectable by a less formal, and less costly, screening
procedure). Requiring the full hearing to be held sooner than ten days
following detention would pose significant logistical difficulties in Win-
ston-Salem. Were it not for a generally excellent screening by the
clerk's review of allegations and the initial medical examination, a
quicker judicial review might be needed.
The law in North Carolina is weak and the practice in Winston-Sa-
lem is inconsistent with respect to the provision of notice concerning arespondent's detention. The statute does require that the examining
56. Respondents found by a qualified physician not to meet the criteria for commitment must
be released pending the hearing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.6(a) (1981).
57. J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 38.
58. 1. KEILITZ, supra note 8, at 74.
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physician notify the court clerk of his or her findings (and, in effect, of
the respondent's detention), and the clerk, after receiving such notice,
must assign counsel and notify counsel, the respondent, and the peti-
tioner of the time and date of the hearing. There is no requirement,
however, that anyone else be notified of the respondent's status or that
the hospitals or the court refrain from notifying particular individuals
whom the respondent indicates he or she would prefer not be notified.
Although the question of notice might be considered moot because pe-
titioners are usually members of the respondent's family and are free to
inform whom they wish, a notification policy should be developed, if
only for those cases in which petitioners are not family. Whether the
respondent should be permitted to prevent notification of particular
persons is a difficult question, particularly if the respondent's compe-
tency to make such a decision is questionable. However, most observ-
ers agree that the respondent's wishes in this regard should be
respected.
Recommendation. It should be the responsibility of staff of the facility in
which the respondent is to be detained pending a commitment hearing to
inform the respondent of his or her right to havefamily members or others
notified of the detention. Staff should explain to the respondent that, un-
less he or she objects, the next of kin will be notified of the detention. If
the respondent expresses a desire to restrict notifications of his or her de-
tention, the facility should respect this and refrain from notiying anyone
other than those required by law to receive notfication of the detention.
5. Prehearing Examination
The time constraints imposed by law on prehearing examinations
present a problem for many people in Winston-Salem. Most observers
believe that the statute was designed for the state's rural areas, where
the two required examinations are conducted in different facilities. In
Winston-Salem, where both examinations are conducted in the same
facility, it ordinarily should not be necessary for both examinations to
be conducted within twenty-four hours of the respondent's arrival at
the facility.
Of greater concern in Winston-Salem is the failure of the law to re-
quire any examination after the first day or two in the respondent's
period of detention. It is important that an examination be conducted
near the time of the hearing so that the court will have current informa-
tion about the respondent's condition. Thus, some local physicians de-
lay the second examination until nearer the time of the hearing; others
conduct the second examination during the first few days of the respon-
dent's detention (but not necessarily within twenty-four hours of the
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first evaluation) and conduct a third examination shortly before the
time of the hearing. Because the second examination may be intended
to function as a check on the findings of the first examiner, delaying the
second examination may jeopardize the respondent's chances for an
early release. Requiring that a third examination be conducted may
increase the cost of the commitment process, but many believe that,
given the court's need for current information, the cost of a third exam-
ination is justified.
Recommendation: Regardless of how many examinations are required,
the respondent should be examined shortly before the commitment hear-
ing, and the results of such examination should be made available to the
court at the hearing.
There is no requirement in North Carolina that the mental health
examiner have any mental health training or experience. As a practical
matter, however, the physicians who conduct evaluations at the facili-
ties in Winston-Salem and at the John Umstead Hospital in Butner are
psychiatrists. Because of this and because it is unclear whether suffi-
cient numbers of physicians with training and experience in mental
health are available in other areas of the state, it would be premature to
recommend that the statute be amended to require that evaluations be
conducted only by such physicians. People in Winston-Salem should
be sensitive to the fact that not all physicians have meaningful mental
health training or experience, however, and should insist that evalua-
tions continue to be conducted only by psychiatrists.
In a number of states, respondents in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings have a right to remain silent during the mental health eval-
uation. It has been held, however, that the privilege against self-in-
crimination in North Carolina does not apply to involuntary
commitment proceedings to preclude the use of statements by the re-
spondent to the mental health examiner.59 Nevertheless, some observ-
ers in Winston-Salem believe that the examiner owes an ethical duty to
advise the respondent how the information generated by the evaluation
might be used. In addition, there is some question whether the respon-
dent's communications to the examiner are protected by a measure of
doctor-patient privilege. Most scholars agree that little or no such priv-
ilege attaches during a court-ordered evaluation. However, if the ex-
amining physician is also the treating physician, as frequently is the
case in Winston-Salem, the matter is not so clear. In a few jurisdic-
tions, the treating physician may not act as the examining physician for
the purposes of commitment.6° In states without such laws, it may be
59. French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
60. In Columbus, Ohio, each respondent is examined by a "court doctor" and by an "in-
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acceptable for the treating physician to examine his or her patient for
the purposes of commitment, so long as the patient is informed that the
results of the examination might subsequently be used for commitment
purposes.
Recommendation: Qualified physicians conducting prehearing examina-
tions should explain to respondents the purpose of the examination and
the way in which the information generated by the examination might
later be used by staff of the mental health facility and the courts.
Another possible weakness in the North Carolina law and in the
practice in Winston-Salem concerns the failure of the state to provide
indigent respondents with the right to an independent mental health
examination at the government's expense. Before the creation of such a
right is undertaken, its costs and benefits must be carefully weighed.
Independent examinations are important for two reasons. They pro-
vide an additional opinion in an area in which opinion reliability is
low, and they provide an enhanced incentive for the state's examiner to
be thorough. Furthermore, given that commitment decisions typically
turn on the medical testimony, without the opportunity to generate in-
dependent medical evidence, the respondent may have little to draw on
in developing a defense.
The cost of providing the right to an independent examination at the
government's expense may or may not be great, depending on the fre-
quency with which the right is exercised. Facility personnel in Win-
ston-Salem indicate that it is extremely rare for a respondent to request
an independent examination. Of course, if a right to such an examina-
tion at the government's expense were created and notice of this right
were provided to the respondent, it is reasonable to presume that re-
quests for such examinations would increase. However, research in
states that entitle respondents to free independent examinations sug-
gests that such examinations rarely are requested, even when notice of
the right is provided.6 Recognizing that independent examinations
usually extend the prehearing period and rarely produce new informa-
tion of use to the defense, counsel ordinarily advise respondents not to
request independent examinations except where there is reason to ques-
tion the original examiner's clinical judgment or objectivity. 62 Where
such reason exists, few would deny that the respondent ought to have
the opportunity for an independent assessment.
dependent doctor;" the independent doctor is bound by the doctor-patient privilege, while the
court doctor is not. I. KEILITZ, supra note 8, at 46.
61. W. FITCH, B. McGRAw, J. HENDRYX & T. MARVELL, supra note 8, at 22.
62. Id
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Recommendation.- Respondents in involuntary civil commitment proceed-
ings who have been admitted to a mental health facility for detention
pending a hearing should be accorded the right to an independent exami-
nation on request, to be provided at the government's expense if indigent.
Notice of this right should be provided at the time of the examination
described in section 122-58.6 of the North Carolina General Statutes.63
6. Prehearing Treatment
The North Carolina law is strong in its recognition of a right to treat-
ment and a right to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication
with drugs. The requirement that written consent be obtained before
the administration of electroshock therapy, experimental drugs or pro-
cedures, or surgery (other than emergency surgery) also is to be com-
mended, given the extraordinary intrusiveness of these procedures.
However, the law's failure to address the question of the respondent's
right to refuse less intrusive treatment is troubling.
Questions concerning the right to refuse treatment have arisen in the
context of the committed person, and the courts have shown a varying
degree of willingness to recognize the right. For the respondent de-
tained pending a hearing, however, the "right" arguably is stronger for
the following two reasons: (1) at this stage, the respondent has not yet
been accorded full due process protections (i.e., has not yet been found
by clear and convincing evidence to meet the criteria for involuntary
care and treatment); and (2) the respondent may have an interest in
being free from the effects of medication or other treatment while par-
ticipating in his or her defense at the hearing. Furthermore, judges
complain that it is often difficult to know whether a respondent's ap-
pearance and behavior in court represent his or her true mental condi-
tion or are the result of medication, making a determination of the
respondent's suitability for commitment very difficult.
Recommendation.- Pending a commitment hearing, the respondent should
be accorded the right to refuse treatment except such emergency treat-
ment as is necessary for the preservation of the health and safety of the
respondent and the protection of other persons andproperty. If any medi-
cation is administered to the respondent during the prehearing detention
period and the respondent's treating physician has any reason to believe
that the respondent's behavior in court will be affected by such medication,
the physician should indicate to the court in writing what medications were
administered Representatives of the mental health community in Win-
ston-Salem shouldprepare a brief reference guide for the use of commit-
63. No independent examination need be provided as a check on the initial "screening" eval-
uation conducted pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.4 (1981).
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ment judges indicating the behavioral effects of particular medications
frequently used to treat psychiatric patients.
7. Conversion to Voluntary Status and Retention of Voluntary
Patients
Lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals in other cities have
complained that persons who are taken against their will to a psychiat-
ric facility for prehearing detention frequently are coerced into becom-
ing voluntary patients.64 In some states, statutes have been enacted to
prevent such coercion.65 The problem of coerced voluntary admission
appears not to exist in Winston-Salem. Rather, it is widely believed
that respondents in Winston-Salem too often request and obtain con-
version to voluntary status as a means of winning the right to request a
speedier release from the hospital.
Most lawyers and psychiatrists in Winston-Salem agree that respon-
dents may convert to voluntary status only with the approval of the
court and that committed persons may convert only with the approval
of the treating physician. Some people in the community believe that
conversion requests too readily are approved and that, as a result, it has
become exceedingly difficult to have someone committed involuntarily
for an extended period of treatment. To the extent that a person's suit-
ability for voluntary status is a treatment question, the policy of leaving
the decision in the discretion of the treating physician (with court ap-
proval for respondent's prehearing) seems sound. But, if respondents
are being allowed to convert to voluntary status without proper regard
for their likelihood of remaining in treatment, some reform of policy or
its application may be needed.
The procedures in Winston-Salem for dealing with voluntary pa-
tients who request their release are unclear. Many people in Winston-
Salem believe that voluntary patients who request their release are al-
ways released and that this, coupled with the tendency of the facilities
to grant respondents' requests for conversion to voluntary status, pro-
vides a way out of the hospital for most persons committed involunta-
rily. Personnel in the facilities report that if a voluntary patient
requesting his or her release is dangerous (or otherwise meets the invol-
untary criteria), the facility either will arrange for a member of the pa-
tient's family to petition for involuntary commitment or, if the patient's
condition is particularly acute and no family member is willing or able
to file a petition, will have the patient's treating physician act as
petitioner.
It obviously is important that facility personnel act to prevent the
64. J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 44.
65. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 3-402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
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release of persons who meet the involuntary commitment criteria. As-
suming that the practices in Winston-Salem are, in fact, as the facility
personnel describe them to be, no recommendations for change appear
to be needed. On the other hand, if the lay perception is more accurate,
a change might be in order. Further objective study of this question
would be necessary before a recommendation could be offered with
any degree of confidence.
8. Prehearing Discharge
The law in North Carolina and the practice in Winston-Salem pro-
viding for the release of respondents and the termination of proceed-
ings upon a finding of noncommittability at the initial examination
protect both the liberty interests of respondents and the fiscal interests
of the state. The procedure is especially valuable in the rural areas of
the state, where it prevents the inappropriate removal of respondents to
state hospitals outside of their communities. The law and practice re-
garding the respondent's status following a finding of noncommit-
tability at the second examination are not so commendable. People in
Winston-Salem and at the John Umstead Hospital in Butner agree that
a respondent will not be committed if the physician's report to the court
indicates that the respondent does not meet the commitment criteria.
Therefore, the requirement that a hearing be held in such cases seems
wasteful. The practice in some facilities in Winston-Salem to detain
the respondent pending the hearing despite a finding of noncommit-
tability at the second examination is contrary to law and seems particu-
larly inappropriate.
In Winston-Salem, a number of people favor the requirement that a
hearing be held (and some even believe it proper to continue to detain
the respondent pending the hearing) even though the second examina-
tion results in a finding of noncommittability. Because the two evalua-
tions are performed at the same facility, they contend, a disagreement
between qualified physicians at least creates a question as to the re-
spondent's committability. However, insofar as the two-examination
requirement is designed to account for the unreliability of clinical as-
sessment, giving the respondent the benefit of the doubt, a failure to
release the respondent under such circumstances seems inappropriate.
If the physician conducting the second examination has some question
about the respondent's suitability for commitment, he or she should be
permitted to consult the physician who conducted the initial examina-
tion before discharging the respondent, but if his or her conclusion is
that the respondent is not commitable, the respondent should be dis-
charged (as required by law) and the proceedings against him or her
should be terminated (as demanded by logic and practicality). Pro-
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spective hearing participants should be notified of the discharge and
termination so they might avoid the effort and expense of preparing for
and appearing in court. In order not to penalize the conscientious de-
fense attorney who may have begun preparing the respondent's case
(and, moreover, in order to promote a vigorous representation prior to
hearing), the attorney appointed to represent the respondent at the
hearing should be compensated despite the prehearing release and
termination.
Recommendation. Upon a finding by the qualifed physician conducting
the second evaluation of the respondent (or the first if the respondent was
detainedpursuant o the emergencyprocedure or upon an affidavit submit-
ted by a qualied physician) that the respondent does not meet the invol-
untary commitment criteria, the respondent should be dischargedfrom the
facility andfacility personnel without delay should communicate this fact
to the clerk of the court in which the hearing is pending. The clerk with-
out delay should notfy the respondent's counsel, the district attorney, the
petitioner, and any witnesses who may have been summoned to appear at
the hearing that the respondent has been found not to meet the commit-
ment criteria and has been discharged Neither the respondent nor the
respondent's counsel should be required to appear in court on the day of
the scheduled hearing, and the court should dismiss the proceedings
against the respondent. The attorney appointed to represent the respon-
dent at the hearing should be compensated despite the respondent's pre-
hearing release.
The failure of the mental health facilities serving Winston-Salem to
notify family members and others when a respondent is released is crit-
icized by many people in the city. If, upon release of the respondent
prior to hearing, the facility notifies the court and the court, in turn,
notifies the respondent's counsel, the district attorney, the petitioner,
and any witnesses summoned to appear at the hearing, most necessary
notifications will be completed. There is some question, however,
whether notification should be made to persons in the community
whose safety may be threatened by the respondent once he or she is
released. Although no one in Winston-Salem appears to be terribly
concerned about this, a notification policy should be considered, if only
to protect the legal interests of the hospitals and their staff.
66
III. COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
Whether or not the court receives a complete picture of the respon-
66. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976).
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dent's condition and is able to arrive at a thoughtful and appropriate
disposition depends largely on the performance of the respondent's at-
torney. The attorney who fully explores the needs of his or her client
and the available defenses and treatment options can do much to en-
sure that the court's decision is informed. Whether the attorney should
zealously advocate for the expressed wishes of the respondent or pursue
what he or she believes is in the respondent's best interests is one of the
most frequently discussed questions in the civil commitment area.
A. Description
1. Right to Representation by Counsel
The law in North Carolina and the practice in Winston-Salem
clearly recognize the right of all respondents in civil commitment pro-
ceedings to be represented by counsel. North Carolina law provides
that respondents alleged to be mentally ill or mentally retarded must be
represented by counsel; such respondents who are indigent or who re-
fuse to retain counsel are to be assigned counsel. Respondents alleged
to be inebriate may waive counsel, if the court determines that they are
sober and capable of making an informed decision.67 As a matter of
practice, every respondent in a commitment proceeding in Winston-
Salem is represented by counsel. Moreover, people in Winston-Salem
estimate that more than ninety per cent of respondents are represented
by assigned counsel.
2. The Manner in Which Counsel is Provided for Indigents
When a clerk or a magistrate issues a custody order, he or she must
inquire whether the respondent is indigent. 68 In Winston-Salem, peti-
tioners are asked to provide information concerning the respondent's
financial status and intention to retain private counsel. If the petitioner
indicates that the respondent is either indigent or not planning to retain
counsel, or if the petitioner is unwilling or unable to provide this infor-
mation, then, upon receipt of a physician's report stating that the re-
spondent meets the involuntary commitment criteria, the clerk assigns
counsel.
The clerk in Winston-Salem maintains a list of private attorneys in
the community who are available for assignment in these cases. Ordi-
narily, an attorney will be assigned three cases to be heard on a particu-
lar day. The clerk makes an effort to assign attorneys for respondents
who are detained in the same facility so that no attorney will have to
visit more than one facility in preparing his or her cases for the hearing
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(b)-(c) (1981).
68. Id. § 122-58.3(c).
30
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/4
436 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
date. The clerk makes assignments by telephone and prepares an order
of assignment for the judge's signature. Although notice of the hearing
is required by statute to be provided to the respondent's counsel at least
forty-eight hours in advance of the hearing,69 some attorneys in Win-
ston-Salem report having received assignments less than twenty-four
hours before the hearing.
3. The Role of Counsel
The North Carolina statutes provide that assigned counsel in com-
mitment proceedings are to serve as though they had been privately
retained.7" No further information concerning counsel's role is pro-
vided by statute.
Counsel for respondents in commitment proceedings in Winston-Sa-
lem generally assume the role of guardian ad litem, acting in what they
perceive to be the best interests of the client. Most observers agree that
attorneys rarely advocate aggressively for the release of their clients.
Frequently, attorneys will allow (and even encourage) their clients to
testify when they know that such testimony will result in commitment.
In a number of cases observed by the research team, the respondent's
counsel elicited testimony from witnesses or provided direct statements
to the judge that seemed to strengthen the case for hospitalization.
This apparently was done intentionally, presumably to impress the
judge with the seriousness of the respondent's difficulties and need for
treatment.7
Many people in Winston-Salem believe that the "best interests" posi-
tion is the appropriate one for attorneys to take in involuntary commit-
ment cases. Some believe that the proper role lies somewhere between
guardian ad litem and advocate. Very few adhere to the advocacy ap-
proach. One attorney voiced the opinion that the central concern of the
respondent's counsel should be to ensure that the respondent is not
"railroaded," but this effort should stop short of "fighting to get the
person out of the hospital." Another attorney noted that, although the
"best interests" approach is favored by the local bar, he personally be-
lieves that commitment proceedings should be adversarial in nature
and that the attorney should pursue whatever goals the client desires.
This attorney admitted, however, that he does not "fight very hard
against the system." A psychiatrist observed that "it would be pre-
69. Id § 122-58.5.
70. Id § 7A-450(b).
71. In one case, the respondent's counsel stated to the court that his client was an inebriate
and was "as dangerous to herself as anyone I have ever seen." The attorney further reported to
the court that his client had been hospitalized a number of times in the past and that another
attorney with whom he had spoken who was familiar with the respondent had told him that he
also thought the respondent was dangerous.
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sumptive on my part to say what the role of counsel should be. The
conflict is between liberty at any cost versus the best interests of the
patient. As a physician, I lean toward best interests, but if I were a
respondent, I would want the representation of a real advocate."
4. The Responsibilities of Counsel
The attorney assigned by the court for an indigent respondent is re-
sponsible for representing the respondent at the initial hearing and
perfecting and concluding an appeal if there is one. Upon completion
of an appeal or upon transfer of the respondent to a regional mental
health facility if there is no appeal, the attorney is discharged. If the
respondent is committed to a mental health facility in the community,
the attorney remains responsible for representing the respondent until
either the attorney is discharged by the court or the respondent is dis-
charged from the community facility.72
In Winston-Salem it appears that counsel's service to the respondent
ceases at the conclusion of the initial commitment hearing. Report-
edly, assigned attorneys virtually never discuss the question of appeal
with their clients, and, as a result, appeals of commitment orders are
practically non-existent. Similarly, respondents committed to facilities
in Winston-Salem reportedly receive no post-hearing representation
from their assigned attorneys.
Although the North Carolina statutes specify no other responsibili-
ties of the respondent's counsel, it generally is expected in Winston-
Salem that counsel will meet with his or her client at least once prior to
the hearing. One attorney voiced the opinion that "effective assistance
of counsel" requires the attorney to interview the respondent, the re-
spondent's treating physician, and the petitioner prior to the hearing.
This attorney admitted, however, that few appointed attorneys were
this thorough.
5. Counsel's Access to Information in Possession of the State or
the Detaining Facility
There is no law in North Carolina specifically providing counsel in
commitment cases with a right of access to any information in posses-
sion of the state or the detaining facility. However, as a matter of prac-
tice in Winston-Salem, all of the records in the court file are available
to counsel, including the petition, the affidavit, and the reports of the
examining physicians. Policies regarding the availability of hospital
records vary from facility to facility. At one facility, no one is allowed
access to a patient's records unless the patient has given written permis-
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.10 (1981).
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sion. At another facility, records usually are available to the respon-
dent's counsel "because it is important that the attorney have all the
information available" about the respondent. However, a spokesper-
son at this facility reported that if a particular attorney were "the Clar-
ence Darrow type," physicians at the facility were less likely to be
cooperative in the provision of information.
One attorney indicated that he had had problems with access to
records at all the local facilities. He indicated that the facilities are
concerned about the confidentiality of records and that facility person-
nel had resisted his efforts to review records on a number of occasions
in the past. He indicated, however, that when he persisted, the facilities
usually "gave in and allowed me access to the information." Another
attorney reported no particular difficulty gaining access to records at
the facilities but complained that the physicians at the facilities some-
times were uncooperative in making themselves available to speak with
him.
6. Procedures for Handling the Respondents' Rejection of the
Assistance of Assigned Counsel
As indicated above, the law in North Carolina provides that respon-
dents in involuntary commitment proceedings "shall be represented by
counsel."7 3 Few persons in Winston-Salem report ever having seen or
heard of a respondent rejecting the assistance of appointed counsel. In
the handful of cases recalled, the respondent'spro se request reportedly
was denied.
7. Incentives and Disincentives for Counsel To Be Thorough
Assigned counsel ordinarily are compensated at the rate of fifty dol-
lars per case. This relatively low rate of compensation may serve as a
disincentive for attorneys to be thorough. Several observers suggested
that, for fifty dollars, an attorney could be expected to do little more
than meet with his or her client before the hearing, briefly review perti-
nent records, and provide representation at the hearing; any meaning-
ful prehearing advocacy or serious effort to arrange for outpatient
placement should not be expected. The practice in Winsion-Salem of
assigning three cases to each attorney for each hearing day, involving
respondents all detained in the same facility prehearing, is regarded
locally as providing an excellent incentive for attorneys to visit their
clients and interview physicians before the hearing, however.
73. Respondents whose commitment is based on inebriety may waive counsel if sober and
capable of making an informed decision. Id § 122-58.7(c).
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B. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendations for Improvement
1. Right to Representation by Counsel
The law in North Carolina and the practice in Winston-Salem re-
garding the provision of counsel are exemplary. The requirement that
non-indigent respondents be represented by assigned counsel if they
fail to retain private counsel is particularly noteworthy. It protects the
legal interests of persons who may not be capable of making a "know-
ing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver of the right to representation.
2. The Manner in Which Counsel is Provided for Indigents
There are a number of different systems for providing counsel for
indigents in commitment hearings, including the use of a public de-
fender, the use of special advocates responsible exclusively or primarily
for commitment cases, and the assignment of private attorneys avail-
able locally. Although no one in Winston-Salem faults the assignment
system employed there, there is reason to believe that assignment sys-
tems result in less effective advocacy. First, private attorneys appointed
to cases on an occasional basis typically have little expertise in the area
of mental health law. Furthermore, because attorney compensation is
relatively low, many of the attorneys attracted to these cases are new
and inexperienced. As a result, attorney competence may be lower
than it is in jurisdictions employing different types of defender systems.
Recommendation: The courts and their allied agencies in Winston-Salem
should study the possibility of creating a new system for pro viding counsel
for indigents in involuntary commitment cases. Specic consideration
should be given to the special counsel system employed in North Caro-
lina's regional hospitals.
The manner in which the clerk or magistrate determines whether a
prospective 'respondent is indigent seems reasonable. Indeed, a more
thorough investigation than that which is presently conducted by the
clerk or magistrate at the time that the affidavit is submitted would
probably cost the state more than the fifty dollars which is ordinarily
paid to the attorney.
The occasional failure of the court to assign counsel for the respon-
dent at least forty-eight hours in advance of the hearing is a serious
weakness in the commitment system in Winston-Salem. In order to
adequately prepare the respondent's case, counsel always should be
given at least forty-eight hours' notice.
Recommendation: Assignment of counsel always should be made at least
forty-eight hours before the time scheduledfor hearing.
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3. The Role of Counsel
Although there appears to be a consensus in Winston-Salem that the
proper role for the respondent's counsel is to act as a guardian ad/item,
serving the "best interests" of the respondent, it should be noted that
Winston-Salem is not in the mainstream of contemporary legal thought
in this regard. In the statutes and case law of many other states, it is
clear that counsel are being directed to serve as vigorous advocates for
their clients' stated interests.74 Moreover, it can be argued that because
North Carolina law requires the assigned attorney to represent the re-
spondent as though he or she were privately retained,75 the guardian ad
/item model may be legally insufficient.
The diagnosis of mental disorder is widely regarded as an imprecise
endeavor.16 Moreover, recent studies have shown that psychiatric pre-
dictions of future dangerousness are terribly unreliable.77 Because of
this, it is inappropriate for anyone to accept without question psychiat-
ric opinion that a respondent is mentally disordered and dangerous.
Because psychiatrists have difficulty assessing respondents' suitability
for commitment, it certainly is unrealistic to assume that respondents'
attorneys can know what is in their clients' best interests. This is par-
ticularly true in jurisdictions employing counsel assignment systems
that attract inexperienced attorneys.
To the extent that the state is adequately represented in commitment
proceedings and that the laws and procedures governing these proceed-
ings are reasonable, a strong advocacy representation by the respon-
dent's counsel should make it no more difficult for the court to
determine the most appropriate disposition for a case. Moreover, a vig-
orous representation by the respondent's attorney is likely to engender
a more vigorous representation by the district attorney. As a result, the
court should receive a more complete picture of the respondent's condi-
tion and the treatment, if any, that is appropriate.
Because the role of counsel has not been the subject of serious con-
cern in Winston-Salem, no major changes will be recommended in this
article. It should be stressed, however, that this aspect of the city's
commitment system has the potential for investigation and challenge.
Pressures to change the role of counsel may arise in the future and
should not come as a surprise.
74. See, e.g., Mich. Prob. Ct. Rules 732(2); Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d
573 (1977).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b) (1981).
76. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
77. J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (DHHS Pub. No.
ADM 81-921) (1981).
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4. The Responsibilities of Counsel
The statutory requirement that counsel represent the respondent at
the initial hearing, on appeal, and during the period of commitment if
the respondent is committed to a local facility is a strong feature of the
commitment law in North Carolina. The failure of counsel to provide
post-hearing assistance is a major weakness in the city's commitment
system. This issue is discussed further in the Post-Hearing Concerns
section.
Given the consensus among attorneys, clinicians, and judges in Win-
ston-Salem that counsel for the respondent should, at a minimum, meet
with and interview the respondent before the day scheduled for the
hearing, it may be fair to assume that respondents whose attorneys
meet them for the first time at their hearings are denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Recommendation. Counselfor the respondent should be required to meet
with the respondent and discuss the respondent's case at least one day
before the hearing date. If it is determined that counselfailed to comply
with this requirement, the court should refuse to compensate counselfor
services rendered and should offer the respondent the opportunity to have
his or her case adjourned in orderfor new counsel to be assigned Fur-
ther, unless counsel is able to provide an adequate reason for failing to
comply with this requirement, he or she should be removedfrom the list of
attorneys eligiblefor appointments of commitment cases.
5. Counsel's Access to Information in Possession of the State or
the Detaining Facility
The practice in Winston-Salem of allowing the respondent's attorney
access to information contained in the respondent's court file compen-
sates, to some extent, for the failure of the North Carolina commitment
statutes to guarantee the respondent or the respondent's counsel access
to information in the state's possession. However, the policy of some of
the local treatment facilities to restrict access to the respondent's
records is a weakness of the commitment system in Winston-Salem.
Given that any information provided to the respondent's counsel be-
comes privileged, the facility can have some assurance that the infor-
mation provided will not be used to harm the respondent.
Furthermore, the competency of respondents in commitment proceed-
ings to decide who should be permitted access to their records arguably
is questionable. To deny the respondent's counsel access to records
simply because the respondent fails to give consent may, indeed, work
to the ironic disadvantage of the respondent.
36
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/4
442 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Recommendation. The respondent's attorney should be provided access to
the respondent's hospital records regardless of whether the respondent has
18provided expressed consent.
The inaccessibility of some examining physicians to respondents' at-
torneys is a serious weakness in the commitment system in Winston-
Salem. In order to prepare a competent defense, it is necessary for
counsel to interview the medical experts prior to the hearing. This con-
cern is particularly compelling in North Carolina, where indigent re-
spondents have no right to an independent examination at the
government's expense.
Recommendation. Mental health facilities in Winston-Salem should en-
courage the physicians on their staffs to meet with attorneys wishing to
interview them concerning respondents in commitment proceedings.
6. Procedures for Handling the Respondent's Rejection of the
Assistance of Appointed Counsel
The requirement of the statute that the respondent be represented by
counsel (unless the grounds for commitment are inebriety and the re-
spondent is found to be competent) would seem to deny the respondent
the option of representing himself or herself. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized a qualified right of defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings to represent themselves if they are competent to waive
the right to counsel.'9 Nevertheless, the North Carolina requirement
probably is reasonable, given that the competency of allegedly men-
tally disordered respondents to waive the right to counsel is inherently
questionable. The general reasonableness of the North Carolina law,
coupled with the infrequency with which respondents in Winston-Sa-
lem attempt to reject the assistance of counsel, suggests that further
discussion of this issue would serve no useful purpose.
7. Incentives and Disincentives for Counsel To Be Thorough
There is a great likelihood that the relatively low compensation pro-
vided to assigned counsel acts as a disincentive for these counsel to be
thorough. Although the practice of assigning three cases to each attor-
ney for each hearing day remedies this to some extent, the lack of pro-
vision for awarding a higher-than-usual fee when an attorney has
devoted an extraordinary amount of time to a case is regarded as a
78. Should facility personnel be reluctant to comply with this recommendation for fear of
liability to the respondent for disclosing confidential information without consent, an advisory
opinion from the State Attorney General or a statutory amendment permitting such disclosure
should be solicited or pursued.
79. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
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weakness in the city's commitment system. If the award of higher fees
in extraordinary cases were possible, the cost of the commitment sys-
tem might rise. On the other hand, to the extent that additional efforts
by defense counsel would result in fewer commitments, the costs to the
state of providing treatment would be saved, and the net result might
be a less costly system.
Recommendation. The judges of the district court should discuss and ex-
plore the possibility of establishing guidelines for awarding a higher-than-
usual fee to any attorney who demonstrates having devoted an extraordi-
nary amount of time to the representation of a respondent in a commit-
ment proceeding.
IV. THE HEARING
The various pieces of information about the respondent generated
during the prehearing processing of the case, including the petitioner's
allegations, the witnesses' statements, the examining physicians' opin-
ions, and any legal considerations, are fitted together for independent
assessment by a judge at the commitment hearing. Whether the pieces
fit well and present a fair and complete picture of the respondent's con-
dition and of the various dispositional alternatives available to the




It is both the law in North Carolina and the practice in Winston-
Salem for every respondent in a commitment proceeding to have a
hearing before the district court within ten days of the day he or she is
taken into custody.8" In Winston-Salem, even during holiday seasons
(when the court may not be sitting on its usual day), arrangements re-
portedly are made for hearings to be held within the ten-day period.8
The clerk of the superior court is required by statute to notify the
respondent and the respondent's attorney at least forty-eight hours in
advance of the hearing, unless notice is waived by the respondent's at-
torney.82 Additionally, the court must provide notice of the hearing to
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.7(a) (1981).
81. Id Commitment cases in Winston-Salem are heard by judges of the Twenty-First Judi-
cial District Court. The judges hear cases without a jury. The five judges of the court rotate
assignments every month. Civil commitment cases are the responsibility of the judge in the
"swing" rotation. The swing rotation consists primarily of domestic relations cases; commitment
cases represent only about two hours of the judge's work week.
82. 1d. § 122-58.5.
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the petitioner at least forty-eight hours in advance, unless waived.83
Reportedly, these notifications always are made in Winston-Salem, but
not always within forty-eight hours of the hearing.
The statutes in North Carolina provide that hearings may be held at
the mental health facility in which the respondent is being treated (but
not in a treatment room) or in the judge's chambers. Hearings may not
be held in a regular courtroom over the respondent's objection if the
judge determines that a more suitable place is available.84 Hearings are
to be closed to the public unless the respondent requests otherwise.
8 5
In Winston-Salem, commitment hearings are held every Thursday
afternoon at the Hall of Justice in a courtroom that has a glass partition
separating the hearing participants from the spectators. Present during
the hearings observed by research staff from the National Center for
State Courts were the judge, the assistant district attorney, one clerk,
two bailiffs, one court reporter, and several respondents and their attor-
neys. Witnesses and other observers were seated behind the glass
partition.
2. The Criteria and Standard of Proof for Involuntary
Commitment
Before a commitment may be ordered in North Carolina, the court
must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the respondent
is mentally ill or inebriate and dangerous to self or others, or mentally
retarded and, because of an accompanying behavior disorder, danger-
ous to others. The court must record the facts that support its
findings.8 6
When applied to an adult, "mental illness" is defined as "an illness
which so lessens the capacity of the person to use his customary self-
control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and so-
cial relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under
treatment, care, supervision, guidance, or control."8 " An inebriate per-
son is defined as one who is "habitually so addicted to alcoholic drinks
or narcotic drugs or other habit forming drugs as to have lost the power
of self-control and that for his own welfare or the welfare of others is a
proper subject for restraint, care, and treatment."88 A mentally re-
tarded person is defined as one "who has significantly sub-average gen-
eral intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in
83. Id § 122-58.20(a).
84. Id. § 122-58.7(f).
85. Id § 122-58.7(g).
86. Id § 122-58.7(i).
87. Id § 122-36(d).
88. Id § 122-36(c).
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adaptive behavior and manifested during his developmental period."89
"Behavior disorder" is defined as "a pattern of maladaptive behavior
that is recognizable by adolescence or earlier and is characterized by
gross outbursts of rage or physical aggression against other persons or
property."9°
A person is considered to be dangerous to self if "he would be unable
without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not
otherwise available, to exercise self control, judgment, and discretion in
the conduct of his daily responsibilities and social relations, or to sat-
isfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self
protection and safety; and . . . there is a reasonable probability of seri-
ous physical debilitation to him within the near future unless adequate
treatment is afforded. . . . A showing of behavior that is grossly irra-
tional or of actions which the person is unable to control or behavior
that is grossly inappropriate to the situation or other evidence of se-
verely impaired insight and judgment shall create a prima facie infer-
ence that the person is unable to care for himself . . . ,,9' A person
also is considered to be dangerous to self if he or she has attempted or
threatened suicide and there is a reasonable probability of suicide un-
less adequate treatment is afforded, or has mutilated or attempted to
mutilate himself or herself and there is a reasonable probability of seri-
ous self-mutilation unless adequate treatment is afforded.92 A person is
considered to be dangerous to others if, within the recent past, he or she
has inflicted, attempted to inflict, or threatened to inflict serious bodily
harm on someone else or has acted in such a manner as to create a
substantial risk of serious bodily harm to someone else and there is a
reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated.93 Thus,
"dangerousness" in North Carolina includes both "active" dangerous-
ness (violence) and "passive" dangerousness (inability to care for self,
termed "grave disability" in some states).
People in Winston-Salem generally agree that these statutory criteria
are substantially observed by the district court judges in Winston-Sa-
lem. In the hearings observed by the research team, the judge in every
case specified in his commitment orders the criteria satisfied and the
facts supporting his findings.
3. The Role of the District Attorney
Assistant attorneys general assigned to the state's four regional psy-
89. Id. § 122-36(e).
90. Id. § 122-58.2(4).
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chiatric facilities are responsible for representing the state's interests at
commitment hearings, rehearings, and supplemental hearings held at
these facilities.94 The law, however, does not provide for the state's
representation in hearings held outside of the regional facilities.
In Winston-Salem, an assistant district attorney represents the state
in commitment hearings. Commitment hearings account for only a
part of this district attorney's caseload. The role that the district attor-
ney assumes in commitment cases in Winston-Salem reportedly is to
present the facts, not to make arguments. One local observer suggested
that "it is more of an administrative chore than a lawyering effort."
One of the local psychiatrists stated that, although the commitment
proceeding is cast as an adversarial one, the district attorney does not
see her role as adversarial. Petitioners occasionally bring attorneys to
court to represent their interests. When this happens, the district attor-
ney reportedly allows the private attorney to present the case for the
state.
4. The Role of the Judge
Although the law in North Carolina does not specify a particular
role for judges in civil commitment cases, it generally is agreed in Win-
ston-Salem that the proper role of the judge (and the role assumed by
most judges in the District Court) is to act as a neutral and detached
hearing examiner-to hear the evidence, rule on objections, decide
whether the evidence proves by the required standard that the respon-
dent meets the criteria for involuntary commitment, and, if the respon-
dent is found to meet the criteria, determine whether outpatient or
inpatient treatment is appropriate.
5. The Presence of the Respondent at the Hearing
The law in North Carolina provides that counsel may waive in writ-
ing the presence of the respondent with consent of the court.95 As a
matter of practice in Winston-Salem, the respondent's presence fre-
quently is waived. Reportedly, attorneys in Winston-Salem routinely
waive their client's appearance in three situations: when the client is so
obviously disordered that his or her appearance in court would serve
only to damage the defense, when the other evidence to be presented
probably will result in the client's release (e.g., the physician's report
recommends discharge), and when the client expresses a wish not to
resist commitment (i.e., either has converted to voluntary status or sim-
94. Id. § 122-58.24.
95. Id § 122-58.7(d).
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ply does not object to involuntary treatment). One judge estimated that
waivers occur in fifty percent of the cases.
Waivers are submitted to the court in writing, signed by the respon-
dent's counsel. The respondent is not required to sign the waiver.
However, one attorney stated that, in order to protect himself, he al-
ways has the respondent sign a form indicating that he or she agrees to
the waiver.
By most accounts, respondents typically are under the influence of
medication during their hearings. Some observers report that it is not
unusual for respondents to be so under the influence of medication that
they do not appear to understand the courtroom proceedings.
6. The Presence of the Examining Physician at the Hearing
North Carolina law provides that certified copies of physicians' re-
ports and hospital records are admissible in evidence.96 Respondents
retain the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, however.97
As a matter of practice in Winston-Salem, physicians almost never
appear in court to testify. One judge estimated that physicians have
testified in fewer than twenty commitment cases in his court in the last
seven years. It generally is expected that the respondent's counsel will
stipulate to the medical report proffered by the district attorney. In
cases in which the respondent's counsel refuses to stipulate to the re-
port, the judge reportedly will either ask the respondent's counsel to
agree to a continuance for one week or adjourn the case until later in
the day (or until another day within the ten-day prehearing period) in
order for arrangements to be made for the physician to appear. Judges
in Winston-Salem are said to admonish attorneys for refusing to stipu-
late, criticizing them for failing to use the prehearing period to work
out informally any problems they may have with the physician's report.
If the physician's attendance is requested, the physician may or may
not appear in court. It was reported that some physicians will attend
but that others simply will report that the respondent no longer meets
the commitment criteria. One attorney suggested that, by refusing to
stipulate, the respondent's attorney can almost guarantee dismissal of
the respondent's case.
The Winston-Salem court staff complain that physicians' reports
usually are handwritten and sometimes are illegible. While the techni-
cal quality of medical reports is considered to vary greatly, most reports
are said to be largely repetitive of information on the petition, contain-
ing little original material from the physician. One attorney claims that
96. Id § 122-58.7(e).
97. Id.
42
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/4
448 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
the reports are so incomplete that they present a small obstacle to the
attorney determined to have his or her client released.
7. The Presence of the Petitioner and Witnesses at the Hearing
The petitioner reportedly attends the hearing and presents evidence
to the court in almost every commitment case in Winston-Salem.
Other witnesses frequently testify as well.
8. Public Access to Hearings
North Carolina law provides that the hearing is to be closed to the
public unless the respondent requests otherwise.9" The practice in
Winston-Salem is for spectators at hearings (including witnesses when
not testifying) to sit in the courtroom behind a glass partition. Specta-
tors can view the proceedings but, reportedly, cannot hear because of
the partition. Exceptions to the practice of requiring non-participants
to sit behind the partition are made for other respondents whose cases
are to be heard by the court the same day (they sit in the jury box
within earshot of proceedings) and visitors receiving special permission
from the court.
9. Continuances
North Carolina law allows for continuances of up to five days on
motion of the respondent's counsel. 99 The statutes provide further that
if the court has sufficient evidence to order commitment but lacks suffi-
cient evidence to determine whether the commitment should be inpa-
tient or outpatient, it may continue a case for disposition up to seven
days for the production of evidence to help in determining disposition.
Continuances of this type may be granted on motion of the respon-
dent's counsel, the state's attorney, or on the court's own motion. 00
In practice, continuances are rare in Winston-Salem. Judges recog-
nize that only the respondent ordinarily may move for a continuance.
One judge reported that, in his court, continuances are not granted un-
less agreed to by both sides.
As indicated elsewhere, if the respondent's counsel refuses to stipu-
late to a medical report, the judge may delay hearing the case for a
short period of time (not beyond the ten day prehearing period) to
make arrangements for the physician to attend the hearing. Because
the delay never serves to continue the case beyond the ten day prehear-
98. Id. § 122-58.7(g).
99. Id. § 122-58.7(a).
100. Id. § 122-58.8(b).
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ing period, people in Winston-Salem refer to these delays as "adjourn-
ments" and consider them not subject to the continuance regulations.
10. Rules of Evidence and Rules of Procedure
Although commitment hearings in Winston-Salem generally are less
formal than other kinds of trials, rules of evidence and rules of proce-
dure generally are observed by the judges. The judges report that for-
mal rules are applied to the extent that objections are made but the
attorneys rarely object.
The judges indicate that evidence of previous commitments fre-
quently is presented in hearings with no objection from the respon-
dent's counsel. Indeed, evidence of previous commitments often is
contained in the medical reports to which respondents' counsel rou-
tinely stipulate. The judges speculate that an objection to the admissi-
bility of such evidence probably would be sustained. Although the
statutes do not address the question of whether evidence of previous
commitments is admissible, to the extent that such evidence relates to
behavior that is not current, an argument can be made that it is irrele-
vant; few would deny that it is prejudicial. Moreover, the statutes do
provide that evidence of previous voluntary admissions is
inadmissable.'1O
Hearsay evidence also frequently is admitted, primarily because the
attorneys fail to object to its admission. A local psychiatrist reported
that petitions often contain allegations that, in his opinion, are either
fabricated or highly exaggerated and that the reports of examining phy-
sicians routinely refer to these allegations as though they were fact. To
the extent to which these reports are stipulated, information of dubious
reliability is entered into evidence with no objection.
11. The Question of the Respondent's Competency to Make
Treatment Decisions
The North Carolina statutes provide that an involuntary commit-
ment "shall in no way affect incompetency proceedings .. ,02 No
one in Winston-Salem suggested to this research staff that the rulings of
the court at the commitment hearing had any bearing on respondent's
competency to make treatment decisions once committed.
12. The Presentation of a Treatment Plan
North Carolina statutes provide that a written treatment or habilita-
tion plan must be formulated within the first thirty days of the respon-
101. Id. § 122-56.6.
102. Id. § 122-55.
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dent's hospitalization. 0 3 Treatment plans typically are not presented
at hearings in Winston-Salem.
13. The Role of Less Restrictive Alternatives
Conceptually, less restrictive alternatives may be viewed as a thresh-
old concern of the question of committability (i.e., if a less restrictive
program of care is appropriate, involuntary treatment may not be or-
dered) or as a placement concern of the commitment order (i.e., the
respondent's commitment must be to the least restrictive program that
is appropriate). In North Carolina, less restrictive alternatives are rec-
ognized primarily as a placement concern of the commitment order.
There is no statutory provision in North Carolina requiring the court to
find an absence of less restrictive alternatives before committing some-
one to involuntary treatment. The law does provide, however, that,
upon a finding that the respondent meets the commitment criteria, the
court may order treatment on an inpatient or an outpatient basis.'
°4
Before ordering outpatient treatment, the court must make findings of
facts as to the availability and appropriateness of the outpatient treat-
ment program. 0 5 Although the decision to commit is not specifically
subject to the least restrictive alternative doctrine, the law does require
that committed persons be discharged as soon as a less restrictive mode
of treatment is appropriate.
0 6
When talking about less restrictive alternatives with lawyers and psy-
chiatrists in Winston-Salem, the conversation invariably turns to the
question of how to make court-ordered outpatient treatment work. No
one collects information about programs in the community that might
be used for outpatient treatment. Moreover, there seems to be a con-
sensus that the court has little power to enforce compliance with an
order of outpatient treatment.
There is a procedure under North Carolina law by which respon-
dents who fail to comply with outpatient treatment may be required to
enter inpatient treatment. 10 7 The director initiates the action by notify-
ing the attorney general of the respondent's non-compliance. The at-
torney general then notifies the clerk of the court in the county in which
the respondent was committed for outpatient treatment and the clerk of
the court in the county where the inpatient mental health facility is
located. The clerk in the county in which the respondent was commit-
ted for outpatient treatment issues an order for the detention of the
103. Id § 122-55.6.
104. Id § 122-58.8(b) (amendedby N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 122-58.1.
107. Id. § 122-58.8(c) (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.10B (Cum. Supp. 1983)).
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respondent in the appropriate mental health facility. When the respon-
dent arrives at the facility, the clerk of the court in that county
calenders a "supplemental hearing" to be held within ten days of the
time that the respondent was taken into custody. At the supplemental
hearing, the court must find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
(1) that the respondent had been given a copy of the outpatient treat-
ment plan and that the plan had been explained to the respondent;
(2) that the respondent had not adhered to the prescribed outpatient
treatment program, and;
(3) that the respondent meets the criteria for involuntary
commitment.
If the court makes these findings, it may order inpatient treatment for a
period of up to ninety days.
The supplemental hearing procedure is not used in Winston-Salem
reportedly because the requirement that an attorney general be in-
volved makes it more cumbersome than simply beginning a new com-
mitment proceeding. In practice, though, new commitment
proceedings rarely are begun in these cases either. Indeed, the court in
Winston-Salem does not often order outpatient treatment because of
the difficulties associated with enforcing compliance.
14. The Court's Role in Determining Place or Conditions of
Treatment
The extent of the court's authority to specify the terms of treatment
lies in its discretion to order outpatient or inpatient commitment to a
particular facility. The judge may specify neither a mandatory mini-
mum treatment period nor the provision of particular modalities of
treatment.
The facilities to which respondents most often are committed by the
court in Winston-Salem are the Forsyth-Stokes Community Mental
Health Center, Forsyth Memorial Hospital, the Mandala Center, and
the John Umstead Hospital in Butner. Commitments to the John Um-
stead Hospital typically are made only when the respondent is unusu-
ally violent or is expected to require long-term care. Typically,
respondents in Winston-Salem are committed to the institution in
which they were detained prior to hearing.
B. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendationsfor Change
1. General Considerations
The requirement that hearings be held in every case (rather than
46
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only on the respondent's request, as in some states'1 8) is a strong fea-
ture of the North Carolina law and procedure. Most observers agree
that it would be unrealistic to presume that respondents in civil com-
mitment proceedings would have the capacity to make intelligent deci-
sions concerning the appropriateness of contesting their commitments
in court, were they required to. Although many people in Winston-
Salem believe that the level of due process built into the commitment
law in North Carolina is excessive, few question the hearing
requirement.
The requirement that hearings be held within ten days of the day the
respondent is taken into custody is probably reasonable, given the way
in which cases are processed prior to the hearing in Winston-Salem.
Some states require that a probable cause hearing be conducted soon
after the custody-taking to guard against erroneous confinement. In
Winston-Salem, however, the screening of allegations conducted by the
clerk or magistrate, coupled with the medical screening (initial evalua-
tion by a qualified physician), probably provide adequate protection
against this. Further discussion of this issue appears in the Prehearing
Detention section.
The provisions requiring that the respondent, the respondent's coun-
sel, and the petitioner be notified of the hearing at least forty-eight
hours in advance are commendable. The failure of the court to assign
counsel within the forty-eight hour period in every case should be con-
sidered a serious problem, however. Further discussion of this issue
appears in the Counsel section.
The practice in Winston-Salem of holding hearings in a courtroom
may not comply with the spirit of the North Carolina statutes. How-
ever, it is convenient for the court and, arguably, is minimally violative
of respondents' legal and personal interests. Given the number of peo-
ple who participate in hearings in Winston-Salem, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to conduct hearings in the judges' chambers. The
question of whether hearings are sufficiently closed to the public is ad-
dressed later in this section.
2. The Criteria and Standard of Proof for Involuntary
Commitment
The criteria for commitment in North Carolina are consistent with
commitment criteria in other states, and the standard of proof meets
the requirements articulated by the United States Supreme Court."0 9
There is general agreement in Winston-Salem that the criteria are
108. See W. FITCH, B. McGRAw, J. HENDRYX & T. MARVELL, supra note 8, at 37; 1. KEILITZ,
W. FITCH, & B. MCGRAW, supra note 8, at VII-I.
109. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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workable. One psychiatrist observed that the criteria "strike a reason-
able balance between civil rights and the protection of the community."
Two persons in Winston-Salem, an attorney and a psychiatrist, ex-
pressed concern about the requirement that respondents be shown to be
dangerous, referring to the notoriously low reliability with which pre-
dictions of violent behavior are made."0° The psychiatrist stated that,
in his opinion, very few respondents in Winston-Salem truly are dan-
gerous. He suggested that if dangerousness is, indeed, the appropriate
criterion for commitment, many people in Winston-Salem are being
committed inappropriately. It may be possible, however, that this psy-
chiatrist and others in Winston-Salem do not fully appreciate the
meaning of dangerousness as it is defined in the North Carolina stat-
utes. Indeed, it is likely that they think of dangerousness solely in
terms of the respondent's propensity for violent behavior and are not
sufficiently sensitive to that part of the definition describing someone
who simply is unable to care for himself or herself.
3. The Role of the District Attorney
Although not required by statute in North Carolina, the practice in
Winston-Salem of requiring the district attorney to represent the state
is an important feature of the city's commitment system. It is generally
recognized in Winston-Salem that the presence of a state's attorney is
essential in commitment hearings, if only to ensure that the judge will
not feel compelled to assume the role of "prosecutor" in these cases.
Moreover, it can be argued, if the respondent is going to be represented
by counsel at this hearing, the balance of the proceeding can be main-
tained only if the state also is represented.
In practice, the district attorney is said not to provide zealous repre-
sentation. Because assigned counsel usually are not vigorous advocates
either, the level of advocacy presented by the district attorney may not
be entirely inappropriate. However, the commitment system may, and
probably should, evolve to the point where counsel for respondents as-
sume a stronger advocacy role. If and when this occurs, it will be nec-
essary for the district attorney's role to change as well. Because the
adversarial system of law is based on a balanced presentation of the
two sides of a case, a strong advocacy position by the respondent's
counsel or the district attorney will demand a response in kind.
Two potential problems can be identified with the practice of al-
lowing petitioners' attorneys to represent the state. First, if the peti-
tioner's attorney advocates vigorously for hospitalization, the
respondent may be at a serious and unjustifiable disadvantage if his or
110. The professional literature is rife with demonstrations that predictions of violent behavior
are wrong much more frequently than they are right. See J. MONAHAN, supra note 77.
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her counsel assumes the role of guardian ad litem. Second, to the ex-
tent that a particular petitioner's motives in proceeding against the re-
spondent are malicious or otherwise inappropriate, allowing the
petitioner's personal attorney to represent the interests of the state
(which are presumed to be beneficient) would be undesirable.
4. The Role of the Judge
The role assumed by judges in commitment proceedings in Winston-
Salem-a neutral and detached hearing examiner-is generally ap-
plauded by observers in the city. A discussion of the judge's role in
enforcing the rules of evidence and procedure appears later in this
section.
5. The Presence of the Respondent at the Hearing
While many people in Winston-Salem believe that the frequent
waiver of the respondent's appearance at the hearing is appropriate,
either as a recognition of the respondent's wishes or as an expression of
concern for the respondent's emotional stability, others are critical of
this practice. They point out that the legal tradition in this county
holds strongly to the notion that a person's liberty should not be cur-
tailed without the person having heard and had an opportunity to con-
front his or her "accusors." One local psychiatrist opined that it was
"fundamentally unfair" for the respondent's counsel to waive the re-
spondent's presence. Moreover, he suggested, the respondent's partici-
pation in all stages of the process has therapeutic value, as it presents a
fact-related basis on which the respondent might understand why treat-
ment is being imposed.
Allowing the respondent's counsel to decide whether or not the re-
spondent should attend the hearing is particularly troublesome. Many
appointed attorneys have limited legal experience and few have any
meaningful understanding of mental disorder. For an attorney to de-
cide that a client need not attend the hearing because the client proba-
bly will be committed in any event is an improper substitution of the
attorney's opinion regarding committability for the court's. With re-
gard to respondents who express a wish not to attend, it is at least argu-
able that the competency of these individuals to make such a decision is
questionable. Finally, it is important that the respondent be present at
the hearing so that the judge will have an opportunity both to observe
the respondent's behavior and to consider the respondent's expressed
wishes. Requiring the respondent's presence should reduce the likeli-
hood that the judge will either commit unnecessarily or release
improperly.
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Recommendation.: The respondent's attendance at his or her hearing
should be mandatory unless the respondent's attending physician states in
writing that the respondent's appearance in court would substantially im-
pair the respondent's mental or emotional stability or would seriously
threaten the safety of others.
Whether respondents should appear in court under the influence of
medication is a controversial question. Some suggest that medication
enables the respondent to more effectively participate in the proceed-
ings and assist in his or her defense; others argue that medication ren-
ders the respondent essentially absent from the proceedings. All would
agree that overmedication is inappropriate. Because so many respon-
dents are medicated at hearings in Winston-Salem, many people in the
city express concern that it is impossible for the judge to know whether
the respondent's behavior in court accurately reflects his or her mental
condition or is a consequence of medication. Further discussion of this
issue is presented in the Prehearing Treatment discussion.
6. The Presence of the Examining Physician at the Hearing
The routine absence of any mental health professional at the com-
mitment hearing is perhaps the most significant difference between
commitment proceedings in Winston-Salem and commitment proceed-
ings in other cities. The question of whether the examining physician
should be required to attend the hearing is a controversial one in Win-
ston-Salem. Some believe that, if required to attend, physicians would
be reluctant to recommend commitment, simply to avoid going to
court. Therefore, they contend, the notion of requiring the physician's
attendance is unrealistic. Others believe that examining physicians
should be required to attend hearings and present oral testimony in
every case. One psychiatrist voiced the opinion that the current prac-
tice amounts to a "medical model" for commitment decision-making.
Because physicians' reports routinely are stipulated to, the recommen-
dations of the physicians generally control the outcomes of the cases, he
observed. If the examining physician were required to present his or
her findings in open court, he suggested, the judge would be better able
to assess the basis for the physician's opinion and arrive at an in-
dependent determination of whether commitment was necessary. This
psychiatrist stated that he simply was not comfortable with the respon-
sibility of making what he regards as the social decision of who should
(or should not) be committed to treatment. Another psychiatrist, while
agreeing in principle that examining physicians should appear in court
to present their findings, was concerned that such a practice would se-
verely strain the resources of the local facilities. Yet another psychia-
trist in Winston-Salem dismissed the suggestion that examining
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physicians be required to attend hearings as too expensive and logisti-
cally difficult.
Several people in Winston-Salem suggested that if hearings were
held at the local mental health facilities, requiring the attendance of
psychiatrists would be much less objectionable. Others observed, how-
ever, that because there are three facilities in Winston-Salem that func-
tion as prehearing detention facilities, this practice would be
logistically difficult and cost-ineffective.
Recommendation. Under ordinary circumstances, the findings of the ex-
aminingphysician should not be admitted into evidence unlesspresented in
oral testimony by such physician. Should the court not wish to require the
attendance ofphysicians at hearings, a telephone communications system
should be employed to enable examining physicians to present their testi-
mony and submit to cross examination by telephone. Should the court
decide against employing such a system, it should refuse to allow the re-
spondent's counsel to stipulate to the report of the examining physician
absent a representation by the respondent's counsel that he or she dis-
cussed the possible consequences of the stpulation with the respondent
and the respondent acquiesced in the stipulation.
Because of the illegibility of some physicians' handwriting, the sub-
mission of handwritten reports to the court has become a major prob-
lem in Winston-Salem.
Recommendation: All reports submitted to the court by examining physi-
cians should be typed or neatly printed
7. The Presence of the Petitioner and Witnesses at the Hearing
The fact that petitioners are virtually always present to testify at
hearings is a strong feature of the Winston-Salem commitment system.
Research in other cities has revealed that the testimony of petitioners
and other lay witnesses often is not available to the court and, as a
result, the allegations of the petitioner typically enter into evidence (if
at all) as hearsay in the examining physician's testimony."' The court
in Winston-Salem should continue to encourage the attendance of peti-
tioners in these cases.
8. Public Access to Hearings
The law requiring that hearings be closed to the public unless the
respondent requests otherwise protects the personal and legal interests
of respondents but may be difficult to strictly implement in practice.
111. See J. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 8, at 75.
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Moreover, to the extent that the law prevents the court from making
exceptions for researchers and others having a compelling social inter-
est in attending and whose attendance would have no foreseeable detri-
mental effect on the respondent's interests, the law may be
unnecessarily restrictive.
Recommendation. The statute requiring that commitment hearings be
closed unless the respondent requires otherwise should be amended to al-
low the court to make exceptions for researchers and others having a
compelling social interest in attending and whose attendance would have
no foreseeable detrimental effect on the interests of the respondent.
The practice in Winston-Salem of holding hearings in full view of
the public may violate the statutory requirement that hearings be
closed to the public. It generally is accepted that respondents have a
legitimate interest in privacy during the commitment hearing. It is un-
clear what benefits are derived from the practice of allowing the public
to view the proceedings.
Recommendation. Measures should be taken to ensure that the general
public is unable to view commitment hearings.
The practice of seating other respondents in the courtroom within
earshot of the proceedings is in violation of the statute. Although no
one in Winston-Salem suggested to the research staff that this arrange-
ment had created problems or that respondents had objected to the
presence of other respondents, the court should be sensitive to the stat-
utory violation this practice represents and should consider other seat-
ing arrangements for these respondents.
Recommendation. The court should investigate the feasibility of seques-
tering respondents from the courtroom during hearings in which they are
not involved
9. Continuances
In contrast to many other cities, where restrictions on continuances
frequently are ignored, the North Carolina laws governing continu-
ances seem to be observed faithfully by the judges in Winston-Salem.
This is a strong feature of the city's commitment system and is particu-
larly important since the prehearing detention period in North Caro-
lina may be relatively lengthy to begin with (up to ten days permitted
by statute). The practice of permitting brief adjournments, within the
statutory period, to allow the examining physician to be summoned to
court apparently is not considered objectionable by anyone in Win-
ston-Salem and has obvious functional utility.
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10. Rules of Evidence and Rules of Procedure
Commitment cases frequently are based on allegations made by fam-
ily members and often grow out of ongoing family disputes. As a re-
sult, the allegations on the petition and the testimony of the state's lay
witnesses may not always be entirely objective. Because of this and
because respondents so frequently are not present in court to dispute
information that may not be trustworthy, it is important that the pro-
ceedings be conducted in such a manner as to ensure that only credible
testimony is admitted into evidence. To the extent that judges conduct
commitment proceedings according to rules of procedure and rule on
objections according to rules of evidence, these concerns may be aca-
demic; however, to the extent that the attorneys fail to make objections,
these concerns are significant.
Recommendation. Counselfor the state and for the respondent should
strive to prevent the introduction of evidence that is in violation of the
formal rules of evidence. When objectionable testimony is given over no
objection, the court should alert counsel that rules of evidence should be
followed
11. The Question of the Respondent's Competency to Make
Treatment Decisions
In some states, the court makes a finding during the commitment
hearing concerning the respondent's competency to make treatment de-
cisions once committed." 2 In states where involuntarily committed pa-
tients are accorded the right to refuse treatment once committed, such a
determination can be useful. Although the law in North Carolina pro-
vides that a commitment shall in no way be taken as an adjudication of
incompetency, it does not rule out the possibility that the question of
incompetency could be heard and disposed of at the commitment hear-
ing (so long, of course, as the requirements of the law governing the
determination of incompetency were followed during the hearing).
Whether such a procedure should be developed in Winston-Salem de-
pends on the prevalence of incompetent treatment refusals in the
mental health facilities.
12. The Presentation of a Treatment Plan
The criteria for involuntary commitment in a number of states re-
quire a showing that the respondent's debilitating condition is one for
which appropriate treatment is available.' The United States
112. See PROVISIONAL SUBSTANTIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at V-15 (1982).
113. Id. at IV-21.
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Supreme Court has held that, at least with respect to persons commit-
ted on the basis of dangerousness to self, involuntary commitment
without the administration of appropriate treatment designed to ad-
dress the person's disorder is unconstitutional." 4 It is largely because
of this right to treatment that the submission of a treatment plan at the
commitment hearing is required in many states. The plan is intended
to provide a basis on which the judge or other decision-making author-
ity may determine the appropriateness of the treatment proposed and
the likelihood that such treatment will bring about a desired change in
the respondent's condition. However, it may be optimistic to think that
a meaningful treatment plan can be constructed during a short prehear-
ing hospitalization period. Because of this and because the local facili-
ties as a matter of practice develop treatment plans for their patients
within thirty days of admission and regularly update these plans during
the period of hospitalization, the fact that treatment plans typically are
not presented at hearings in Winston-Salem probably is of little
significance.
13. The Role of Less Restrictive Alternatives
Statutes in a number of states provide that a court may not involun-
tarily commit anyone for whom a less restrictive alternative is appro-
priate." 5 Statutes in some states provide that, upon a finding of
committability, the court must commit to the least restrictive program
of treatment that is appropriate." l6 Statutes in other states do not ad-
dress the question of less restrictive alternatives at all.
The failure of the statutes in North Carolina and the local proce-
dures in Winston-Salem to specifically require that the court make
commitment decisions in accordance with the least restrictive alterna-
tive principle is a weakness of the city's commitment system. Neither
the interests of the respondent nor those of society are satisfied when
treatment is imposed that is more intrusive and more expensive than is
necessary to accommodate the respondent's disorder. Because North
Carolina law requires treatment facilities to release involuntarily com-
mitted patients "as soon as a less restrictive mode of treatment is avail-
able," it would be absurd to suggest that the courts need not be bound
by the least restrictive alternative principle in committing persons to
these facilities.
Certainly, most of the judges in Winston-Salem, in fact, give some
degree of consideration to the question of less restrictive alternatives
when hearing commitment cases. Unless the court is required, before
114. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
115. PROVISIONAL SUBSTANTIVE GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at V- 1I.
116. Id
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ordering commitment, to make a finding that less restrictive alterna-
tives were considered and that none was found to be appropriate, the
question of less restrictive alternatives too easily is disregarded. Simi-
larly, unless the court is required, before ordering inpatient treatment,
to make a finding that involuntary outpatient treatment was considered
and was determined not to be appropriate, the option of outpatient
commitment too easily is overlooked.
Recommendation. Before ordering involuntary treatment, the court
should consider whether any less restrictive alternative would be appropri-
ate to accommodate the respondent's disorder and should make a finding
that less restrictive alternatives were considered and none was found to be
appropriate. Before ordering inpatient treatment, the court should con-
sider whether involuntary outpatient treatment would be appropriate and
should make a finding that outpatient treatment was considered and was
found inappropriate.
In many jurisdictions, the state's attorney is required to investigate
the appropriateness and availability of less restrictive alternatives and
prove as part of his or her case that no less restrictive alternative to
commitment exists." 17 Research suggests, however, that in jurisdictions
with such requirements, the state's attorney often is unaware of the al-
ternatives that exist in the community and conducts little or no mean-
ingful investigation."18 While this behavior is not to be excused, it does
suggest that the state's attorney should not be solely responsible for
investigating less restrictive alternatives. The best interests of the pa-
tient would be served if, in addition to and regardless of any responsi-
bility that the state's attorney may have to investigate less restrictive
alternatives, the respondent's attorney was required to assume this re-
sponsibility as well.
The fact that no one in Winston-Salem is responsible for developing
and maintaining information for the court about community mental
health programs available to function as less restrictive alternatives is a
weakness of the Winston-Salem commitment system. Assigned counsel
cannot be expected to be very familiar with such programs; but infor-
mation about community treatment programs could be developed and
maintained through the offices of the court and could be made avail-
able to assigned counsel on request. Professionals who are actively in-
volved with the delivery of social services in the city can and should be
called upon to assist in identifying community treatment programs and
making appropriate information about these programs available to the
117. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 37.1-67.3 (Supp. 1981).
118. J. ZIMMERMAN & W. FITCH, supra note 4, at 26.
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court. "9 The information generated should be available at the court-
house for the use of prospective petitioners, respondents' attorneys, and
judges.
Recommendation. The court, in collaboration with the local mental
health association and other agencies, should develop and keep current
information about treatment programs in the community that might be
appropriate and available as less restrictive alternatives to involuntary
hospitalization for respondents in commitment proceedings. It should be
the responsibility of the respondent's counsel and the court to be familiar
with this information and use it to identif' the least restrictive treatment
option that is appropriate and available for respondents.
The fact that the court does not frequently exercise the outpatient
treatment option may be a weakness of the commitment system in
Winston-Salem. One psychiatrist in Winston-Salem stated that he
would recommend outpatient treatment much more frequently than he
did "if the judges would ever order outpatient treatment." This psychi-
atrist suggested that, in many cases, inpatient care is not very useful
because a patient's symptoms may rapidly remit because of medication
and the patient may be quickly discharged, only to stop taking his or
her medication and deteriorate to the point where further hospitaliza-
tion is necessary. If judges would more often order outpatient treat-
ment, he suggested, fewer cases would return to court because longer-
term "maintenance" treatment could be provided.
The difficulty of enforcing the respondent's compliance with the
terms of an outpatient treatment program is a serious problem to which
there are no handy solutions. However, if the existing mechanisms for
converting non-compliant involuntary outpatients to inpatient status
were more frequently used, and if respondents receiving outpatient
treatment were advised that non-compliance likely would result in such
a conversion, the rate of compliance might rise.
One psychiatrist in Winston-Salem suggested that converting an in-
voluntary patient from outpatient status to inpatient status was im-
proper because the original outpatient order was based on a finding
that outpatient, not inpatient, treatment was appropriate. However, in-
sofar as every commitment order, whether inpatient or outpatient, is
based on a finding that treatment is necessary (i.e., that the respondent
is committable), it would seem reasonable to conclude at a supplemen-
tal hearing that if outpatient' treatment failed because of the patient's
unwillingness to cooperate, then outpatient treatment was not appro-
priate and inpatient treatment should be ordered.
119. The local Mental Health Association might be particularly well equipped to provide such
assistance.
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The reluctance of the court in Winston-Salem to use the "supple-
mental hearing" procedure to convert non-compliant involuntary out-
patients to inpatient status may be ill-advised. If the court permitted
the assistant district attorney responsible for original commitments in
Winston-Salem to discharge the responsibilities placed by statute on
the attorney general, it would seem that the supplemental hearing pro-
cedure would be less cumbersome than beginning a new commitment
proceeding against the person. Indeed, the petitions, affidavits, and
prehearing examinations required for initial proceedings would be re-
placed by two telephone calls-one from the director of the outpatient
program to the district attorney and one from the district attorney to
the clerk of the court. This procedure should prove to be less costly
than beginning a new commitment proceeding and, because it is sim-
pler to use, likely would be used more frequently. Moreover, to the
extent that the procedure is useful, it should make outpatient treatment
more attractive as a commitment option.
Recommendation: The assistant district attorney responsible for repre-
senting the state in commitment proceedings in Winston-Salem should be
authorized to discharge the responsibilities imposed by statute on the at-
torney general in supplemental hearing proceedings to convert allegedly
non-compliant involuntary outpatients to involuntary inpatient status.
Further, the court should encourage staff of the treatmentfacilitiespro vid-
ing involuntary outpatient care to use the supplemental hearing procedure
to convert noncompliant involuntary outpatients to inpatient status.
14. The Court's Role in Determining Place or Conditions of
Treatment
Some observers in Winston-Salem believe that the court should have
the discretion to commit respondents for mandatory minimum periods
of treatment. The clear majority, however, feel strongly that the courts
should have no such discretion. Moreover, no one seriously suggests
that the courts should have the authority to specify particular treatment
modalities or other medical conditions of commitment. The law in
North Carolina and the practice in Winston-Salem, leaving postcom-
mitment treatment decisions in the hands of mental health personnel,
are consistent with procedures in other states and seem to be entirely
satisfactory.
V. POSTHEARING CONCERNS
For those respondents whose cases are dismissed at the hearing, the
court's involvement ceases. For respondents who are committed to
some form of treatment, however, the potential exists for legal
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problems and court involvement throughout the commitment-period.
Under the authority of the court order, the facility to which the respon-
dent is committed will attempt to exert its influence over the respon-
dent's behavior; to the extent that the respondent resists the intentions
of the facility, the question of "patients' rights" arises. This section
discusses this question and others that may come to the attention of the
court following the initial commitment hearing.
A. Description
1. Notification Requirements
If the court orders outpatient treatment, a copy of the order must be
sent to the outpatient treatment facility designated. 12  No such notifi-
cation is required if the respondent is hospitalized. If the court finds
that the commitment criteria are not met, it must discharge the respon-
dent and provide notification of the discharge to the facility in which
the respondent was last a patient. 12 Mental health facilities to which
respondents are committed are required by law to provide notification
of discharge and conditional release to the clerk of the superior court of
the county of commitment and of the county in which the facility is
located. 
22
For the most part, notification of commitment or dismissal at the
commitment hearing seems to be carried out in conformity with the
prescriptions of statute. With regard to the requirement that mental
health facilities notify the court of a committed patient's discharge, the
research staff was told that "sometimes it's done, and sometimes it's
not."
In addition to the notification of discharge required by statute, the
facilities serving Winston-Salem often provide notification to members
of the patient's family when discharge of the patient is imminent. A
spokesperson at one of the facilities indicated that such notification al-
ways is provided unless the patient objects. A spokesperson at another
facility indicated that such notification is not provided unless requested
by the patient. When an involuntary patient is admitted to the John
Umstead Hospital, staff at the facility reportedly ask the patient
whether he or she will consent to communications from the facility to
members of his or her family and staff of the community mental health
center in the patient's community. If the patient expresses a wish that
particular persons or agencies not receive information, the hospital
notes these restrictions and honors them. If the patient imposes no re-
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.8(b) (1981).
121. Id § 122-58.8(a).
122. Id § 122-58.13.
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strictions, notifications of the patient's discharge are sent to the pa-
tient's immediate family and to staff of the community mental health
facility in the patient's home community.
2. The Right of Appeal
North Carolina law provides that respondents may appeal commit-
ment decisions to the court of appeals. Appeals are heard on the rec-
ord. The filing of an appeal does not stay the commitment, unless so
ordered by the court of appeals.
123
Appeals from commitment orders are rare in Winston-Salem, report-
edly for two reasons: (1) appointed counsel consider their responsibili-
ties to respondents essentially to cease at the conclusion of the
commitment hearing, and (2) appeals typically are not heard until ap-
proximately six to eight months after they are filed, by which time most
respondents can expect to have been discharged.
3. Institutional Activities
For the most part, the court's involvement with the mental health
facility ends with the order of commitment. Mental health facilities in
effect retain the right to accept or refuse to accept committed persons
into their programs and, once accepted, to select and manage their
treatment. Reportedly, the facilities serving Winston-Salem admit eve-
ryone committed by the court, presumably because the commitment
typically is ordered at the recommendation of a physician on the staff
of the admitting facility.
North Carolina law guarantees patients the right to treatment re-
gardless of age or degree of mental illness or retardation. 24 The law
also provides a right to be free from unnecessary or excessive medica-
tion with drugs and prohibits the use of medication as punishment or
discipline.' 25 Treatment involving electroshock therapy, the use of ex-
perimental drugs or procedures, or surgery (other than emergency sur-
gery) may not be given without the written consent of the patient if
competent. 1
2 6
Mental health facilities in North Carolina are not required to pro-
vide periodic progress reports to the committing court, and the facilities
serving Winston-Salem reportedly do not provide such reports.
North Carolina law provides that any interested person may petition
the court for an order directing a committed patient transferred to an-
other mental health facility. The court may issue a transfer order "if
123. Id § 122-58.9.
124. Id § 122-55.5.
125. Id § 122-55.6.
126. Id
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such order is in the best interest of the committed person and the trans-
fer conforms to the state policy of the least restrictive mode of treat-
ment." 27  The law further requires that before a patient may be
transferred, he or she (and his or her next of kin or guardian) must be
given "reasonable written notice," which must include the reason for
the transfer. Transfers for emergency surgery are excepted from the
notice requirement.'28
Transfers reportedly occur in Winston-Salem in three situations:
(1) when a patient becomes so violent as to require hospitalization in a
more secure facility; (2) when a patient's condition suggests that long-
term care will be necessary; and (3) when the hospital bills for a patient
at a private facility no longer are paid.1 29 Transfers usually are to the
John Umstead Hospital in Butner.
Although some hospital personnel in Winston-Salem admit an unfa-
miliarity with the procedures for transferring a patient, the assistant
clerk of the superior court reportedly "takes care of the details" and
ensures that transfers are accomplished in conformity with the law. By
all accounts, transfer petitions routinely are granted. No one in Win-
ston-Salem could recall a case in which a patient challenged a transfer.
Indeed, no one was aware what procedure would be used to challenge a
transfer.
The North Carolina statutes require that committed patients be dis-
charged "as soon as a less restrictive mode of treatment is appropri-
ate."' 3 ° The statutes further require unconditional discharge at any
time that the chief of medical services at a facility determines that a
patient no longer is in need of hospitalization.13' Committed patients
may be released conditionally, for periods of up to thirty days, on spec-
ified conditions. Violation of the conditions is grounds for return of a
person to the facility.
3 2
Reportedly, involuntary patients in Winston-Salem are discharged
unconditionally as soon as they improve to the point where they no
longer meet the involuntary commitment criteria. According to hospi-
tal personnel, this almost always occurs before the expiration of the
maximum commitment period ordered by the court. At the John Um-
stead Hospital, the statutory language requiring the release of involun-
tary patients "as soon as a less restrictive mode of treatment is
appropriate" is interpreted literally; patients are released if they are
127. Id. § 122-81.2(c).
128. Id. § 122-55.6.
129. The private facilities reportedly will retain a patient at no charge for a limited period of
time before either discharging or transferring the patient.
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (1981).
131. Id. § 122-58.13.
132. Id
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suitable for a less restrictive mode of treatment, whether or not such
mode of treatment is available.
The facilities in Winston-Salem rarely release patients conditionally,
but the John Umstead Hospital in Butner frequently does. Although
the law in North Carolina does not permit an institution to convert a
patient from involuntary inpatient status to involuntary outpatient sta-
tus, in effect this can be accomplished by conditional release. Person-
nel at the John Umstead Hospital recommend the use of the
conditional release procedure for this purpose.
All of the facilities receiving persons committed from the district
court in Winston-Salem reportedly provide discharge planning services
of one kind or another. Discharge planning typically includes contact-
ing members of the patient's family who might be willing to offer the
patient a place to live and attempting to arrange for the patient's partic-
ipation in a community services program on a voluntary basis. Every-
one in Winston-Salem notes sadly that community programs are too
few.
4. Patients' Rights
In addition to the rights of patients to be treated and to be free from
particular types of unwanted treatment, basic human rights are recog-
nized by statute in North Carolina, including rights to dignity, privacy
and human care, and the right to live as normally as possible while
receiving care and treatment. 33 Other more specific rights also are rec-
ognized, including rights to send and receive mail, make and receive
confidential telephone calls, keep and use personal clothing, and exer-
cise all civil rights, including rights to dispose of property, execute in-
struments, make purchases, enter into contractual relationships,
register and vote, and marry and divorce (if not adjudicated incompe-
tent)."'34 Reportedly, all of these rights are accorded to involuntary pa-
tients at the local facilities and at the John Umstead Hospital in Butner.
As discussed previously in the Counsel section, the attorney assigned
to represent an indigent respondent at the initial court hearing ordina-
rily remains statutorily responsible for the respondent's representation
until the respondent is unconditionally discharged, if commitment was
to a community mental health facility. Nevertheless, assigned counsel
in Winston-Salem reportedly consider their responsibilities to cease at
the conclusion of the commitment hearing. Consequently, indigent re-
spondents committed to community facilities are provided with no le-
gal representation during the commitment period. The Mandala
Center in Winston-Salem employs a non-attorney patient's ombudsper-
133. Id § 122-55.1.
134. Id. § 122-55.2.
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son, who is responsible for investigating patients' grievances. This
ombudsperson reportedly spends approximately one-third of her time
doing ombudsperson work; the balance is spent doing public relations
work for the hospital.
Respondents committed to the John Umstead Hospital in Butner are
represented post-hearing by a "special counsel" who is appointed by
the senior regular resident superior court judge of the judicial district in
which the John Umstead Hospital is located. In addition, the hospital
employs a non-attorney patient advocate who is responsible for investi-
gating patients' grievances and bringing legitimate complaints to the
attention of the hospital's human rights committee. The advocate in-
vestigates allegations of patient abuse, neglect, and exploitation and
consults the special counsel if she has a question about the appropriate-
ness of a particular commitment.
5. Rehearings
The North Carolina statutes provide that the initial commitment pe-
riod may not exceed ninety days. 35 Inpatient commitment may be ex-
tended by a rehearing procedure, 36 but outpatient commitment may
not be extended. 137 If the chief of medical services of an inpatient facil-
ity determines that treatment of an involuntary patient will be neces-
sary beyond the initial commitment period, he or she may notify the
clerk of the superior court of the county in which the facility is located
at least fifteen days before the end of the period. At least ten days
before the end of the period, the clerk must schedule a rehearing and
notify the patient and his or her counsel of the time and place of the
rehearing. Rehearings are held at the facility in which the patient is
receiving treatment. 38 Rehearings are governed by the same proce-
dures as initial hearings, and the patient has the same rights as he or
she had at the initial hearing, including the right to appeal. A patient
found to continue to meet the commitment criteria may be recommit-
ted for a period not to exceed 180 days.
With regard to further rehearings, the law' 39 dictates certain require-
ments. Fifteen days before the end of the second commitment period,
and annually thereafter, the chief of medical services of the facility
must review the condition of each involuntary patient; if he or she de-
termines that a patient is in need of continued treatment, he or she may
so notify the patient, the patient's counsel, and the clerk of the superior
135. Id § 122-58.8(b).
136. Id § 122-58.11.
137. Id § 122-58.11(0.
138. In the rare case in which someone committed to one of the facilities in Winston-Salem is
scheduled for a rehearing, the rehearing is held in a courtroom at the Hall of Justice.
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.11 (1981).
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court of the county in which the facility is located. Unless the respon-
dent, through his or her counsel, files with the clerk a written waiver of
the right to a rehearing, a rehearing is scheduled and held in the same
manner as initial rehearings are scheduled and held. Recommitment
may be ordered for up to one year.
Rehearing, practices in Winston-Salem and at the John Umstead
Hospital in Butner reportedly conform essentially with the procedures
prescribed by statute.
B. Strengths, Weaknesses, and Recommendationsfor Improvement
1. Notification Requirements
The notification requirements imposed by statute in North Carolina
seem reasonable. However, the absence of any requirement that notifi-
cation of the respondent's commitment to or discharge from a treat-
ment facility be given to the respondent's next of kin, guardian, or
other relatives, or that the hospital or the court refrain from notifying
particular individuals whom the respondent indicates he or she does
not want notified, suggests avenues for possible improvement. Because
of the concern that families typically have for the whereabouts of their
mentally disabled members, it is advisable that a notification policy be
developed. Whether the respondent should be permitted to prevent no-
tification of particular persons is a difficult question, particularly if the
respondent's competence to make such decisions is questionable. How-
ever, most observers in Winston-Salem agree that the respondent's
wishes in this regard should be respected.
Recommendation.: It should be the responsibility of staff of thefacility in
which the respondent is committed to inform the respondent of his or her
right to have famiy members and others notfied of the commitment and
of any subsequent discharge. Staff should explain to the respondent that
unless he or she objects, the next of kin or guardian will receive such
notication. If the respondent expresses a wish thatparticularpersons not
receive notification, the facility should refrain from notiying such persons
unless required by law to do so.
2. The Right of Appeal
It is important that appeals be available to persons committed to in-
voluntary treatment, not only to allow for the review of particular
cases, but also to allow for the settling of points of law interpreted dif-
ferently by different judges. The practical impediments to appeal for
persons committed in Winston-Salem, i.e., the unavailability of counsel
for indigents and the slowness of the appellate process, are serious
weaknesses in the city's commitment system.
63
Fitch: Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disabled: Implementation o
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1984
INVOL UNTAR Y COMMITMENT
Recommendation. Immediately following an order of commitment, the
respondent's counsel should explain to the respondent his or her right to
appeal and should be available to pursue an appealfor the respondent if
the respondent so desires and there is a legitimate groundfor appeal. The
judges of the district court, together with the judges of the court of ap-
peals, should develop a policyfor compensating appointed counselpursu-
ing an appeal on the respondent's behalf. The court of appeals should
maintain an expedited calendarfor commitment appeals.
3. Institutional Activities
The statutes in North Carolina regulating the institution's treatment
of committed persons are exemplary. The specification of a right to
treatment serves to guard against the patient "warehousing" that was
common at many hospitals throughout the country in past years. The
mandate that medication not be used for punishment or discipline also
is important, given the ease with which medication can be misused for
patient management. The lack of a provision in the law or a consistent
policy in the local facilities for dealing with patients who refuse medi-
cation is a weakness in the commitment system.
Most observers in Winston-Salem believe that, because the court
does not participate in treatment or release decisions, no useful purpose
would be served by requiring treatment facilities to provide periodic
reports concerning the progress of committed persons. Furthermore,
the time spent preparing and submitting such reports would reduce the
availability of facility personnel to treat patients.
The procedures used to transfer involuntary patients from one facil-
ity to another are not the subject of great concern in Winston-Salem.
However, because the transfer process as it is used in Winston-Salem
typically operates to move someone from one of the local facilities to
the regional hospital in Butner (arguably a more restrictive setting, if
only because it is outside of the patient's community), the case can be
made that the patient should be provided with an opportunity to chal-
lenge the transfer in court.
Recommendation: A copy of the petition for transfer should be served on
the patient and the patient's counsel at least forty-eight hours prior to the
proposed transfer. The patient should be given a right to a hearing, on
request, to challenge the petitionfor transfer before a judge of the district
court within the forty-eight hour period Notice of this right should be
provided to the patient and the patient's attorney with the petition. The
patient's attorney should be responsiblefor representing the patient at the
hearing, if one is requested If the patient is not represented by counsel,
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counsel should be appointed The judges of the district court should de-
velop a policyfor compensating appointed counselfor this representation.
The conditional release provision is a strength of the North Carolina
commitment procedure because it allows a mental health facility to
work with and retain some control over a patient during his or her
period of readjustment to community living. Because it allows the fa-
cility to recall a patient whose readjustment is unacceptable, it encour-
ages facilities to try an earlier return to the community of patients
whose prognoses are improved but still imperfect. The John Umstead
Hospital in Butner reportedly makes excellent use of the conditional
release procedure. That the facilities in Winston-Salem rarely use the
procedure is a weakness in the city's commitment system.
Recommendation: Persons responsible for dischargeplanning at the facil-
ities in Winston-Salem should more frequently consider conditional re-
lease as a discharge option.
The efforts of the facilities serving Winston-Salem to refer released
patients to community services programs are to be commended. It is
unfortunate, however, that so few programs exist. The legal and
mental health communities in Winston-Salem should work with local
foundations and others interested in supporting the development of
such programs.
4. Patients' Rights
The law in North Carolina provides for the protection of the human
rights of committed persons. Given that mental institutions through
the years have acquired a poor reputation in this regard, this statutory
concern for patients' rights in North Carolina is to be commended.
The impressions of the research staff, based on visits to institutions
serving Winston-Salem, were that these facilities protect the rights of
patients to an unusually high degree. Meaningful programs of treat-
ment seem to be available, and living conditions seem relatively
pleasant.
The statutory recognition of an involuntarily committed patient's
right to legal representation during the commitment period is a strong
feature of the commitment law in North Carolina. The ordinary affairs
of life that require the assistance of an attorney, e.g., marriage, divorce,
and bankruptcy, do not cease during commitment; rather, a host of new
legal problems typically arises. To the extent that the legal representa-
tion prescribed by statute is not reflected in practice, the commitment
system suffers.
The use of special counsel to provide continuing legal representation
for patients committed to the John Umstead Hospital in Butner is an
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excellent aspect of North Carolina practice. That hospital's use of a
patient advocate to respond to patient grievances and refer appropriate
problems to the special counsel seems to result in an effective patient
protection system. In contrast, the failure of appointed counsel in Win-
ston-Salem to provide continuing representation for persons committed
to the local facilities violates the law and may seriously diminish the
patient's ability to protect his or her legal interests while hospitalized.
The employment of a part-time ombudsperson at the Mandala Center
is to be commended, but it should not be regarded as a satisfactory
substitute for the provision of legal assistance.
Recommendation: Unless a system is developed in Winston-Salem
whereby special counsel are designated to be responsible for representing
patients committed to the city's inpatient facilities, counsel assigned to rep-
resent the respondent at the initial hearing should be required to remain
responsible for the respondent's representation during the commitment pe-
riod (as required by law).
5. Rehearings
The rehearing procedures prescribed by statute in North Carolina
seem fair. Because rehearings are relatively rare in Winston-Salem,
however, little is known about how these procedures work. The only
issue raised by observers in Winston-Salem concerning the rehearing
process deals with the exclusion of persons of outpatient status from the
rehearing procedure. Because of the great potential of the involuntary
outpatient device for the long-term, minimally restrictive care of the
chronically mentally ill, it makes little sense to limit outpatient commit-
ment to one ninety-day period.
Recommendation: A statutory amendment should be sought making the
rehearing procedure applicable to persons of involuntary outpatient
status.
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil commitment laws provide merely the skeleton of civil commit-
ment systems. The vital functions are better represented by the prac-
tices, customs, and mores of the people who are responsible for
implementing these laws in the community. Civil commitment reform
that fails to take this into account is of limited value.
This Article has focused on the everyday workings of the civil com-
mitment system in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. It has examined in
some detail the means employed in the city to implement the state's
commitment laws and has presented a practical analysis of what works
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well and what does not. By focusing on these successes and failures,
policy-makers in Winston-Salem have an excellent opportunity to ef-
fect meaningful reform in their city's civil commitment system.
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